Rethinking the Function of Financial Assurance for End-of-Life Obligations by Mackie, C & Besco, L
7-2020 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORTER 50 ELR 10573
When an operator does not perform their end-of-life obligations, the burden falls on other stakeholders in the energy project, such as local 
communities, taxpayers, and the environment. Financial 
assurance requirements (FARs) are a regulatory tool that 
exhibits potential to prevent this outcome from materi-
alizing. They necessitate that an operator (or a company 
affiliated with them, such as a parent company) evidences 
ability to pay for the future works. When FARs are imple-
mented within a legal framework, measures commonly uti-
lized by operators include surety bonds, letters of credit, or 
bank guarantees purchased from a third party provider, a 
parent company (corporate) guarantee, a self-bond, or cash 
deposit. However, certain measures are less effective than 
others and some are completely ineffective in the event of 
the operator’s bankruptcy prior to the project’s completion. 
And while FARs exist—albeit in compromised form—in 
many frameworks in the coal, oil and gas, and nuclear sec-
tors, they are often conspicuously absent in frameworks 
governing renewable energy projects, with Canada and the 
United Kingdom (U.K.) providing ready examples. In this 
Article, we develop a theoretical framework to aid their 
more efficacious design.
I. Introduction
When an energy project reaches the end of its functional 
life, the operator1 is often required under their permit, 
license, or other authorization to close the site safely and 
restore it to its original condition or to a level that could 
accommodate another productive use.2 These “end-of-life 
1. We use the term “operator” in this Article to reflect the person—invariably a 
company—specified under the pertinent legal framework as responsible for 
undertaking these requirements. Under certain frameworks, such as those 
governing oil and gas operations, there may be more than one such person. 
And in certain sectors, such as nuclear, and oil and gas, the term “licensee” 
may be more accurate. Or, it may be the “grantee,” “owner,” “landowner,” 
or “developer” in the context of renewable energy production. However, for 
ease of reference and for the sake of consistency, we use the term “operator” 
throughout unless the context necessitates otherwise.
2. The works to be undertaken will vary according to the type of energy project 
and the location of the site (e.g., onshore or offshore). They may, for ex-
ample, cover backfilling, stabilizing, regrading, recontouring, and revegetat-
ing land in the case of a surface coal mine; plugging a well with cement and 
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obligations”3 feature prominently in legal frameworks gov-
erning the oil and gas,4 coal,5 and nuclear6 sectors of the 
United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom (U.K.), 
the jurisdictions of focus in this Article. They may also 
be imposed upon operators under frameworks regulating 
their comparatively nascent renewable sectors.7
End-of-life obligations may be imposed to achieve a 
wide variety of objectives. There may be an aesthetic goal 
associated with requiring their performance, in that visual 
impacts of the project on the landscape may be addressed 
(e.g., removal of turbines when generation of electricity at 
a wind farm ends). They may seek to avoid the steriliza-
tion of land in society, enabling the site to be returned to 
its previous use or employed for another productive activ-
ity. And ensuring safe maritime navigation will be key for 
offshore projects. However, for sites that pose a risk of pol-
lution and/or harm to human health in the event of their 
improper abandonment, such as oil, gas, and coal opera-
removing surface infrastructure in the case of oil and gas operations; dealing 
with wastes and reducing radioactivity at the site in the case of nuclear reac-
tors; and dismantling and removing assets and other infrastructure, such as 
cabling, in the case of solar and wind farms. The remediation of environ-
mental damage caused at the site by the energy project may also be required.
3. We use the phrase “end-of-life obligations” as an umbrella term to encom-
pass works traditionally associated with reclamation, restoration, abandon-
ment, and decommissioning.
4. In relation to the decommissioning of offshore oil and gas wells, platforms, 
and pipelines on the outer continental shelf (OCS) of the United States, see 
30 C.F.R. §§250.1700-.1754 (2019). In relation to abandoning, plugging, 
and restoring oil and gas wells in British Columbia, Canada, see §§26 and 
28 of the Drilling and Production Regulation, B.C. Reg. 282/2010. And 
in relation to the decommissioning of offshore oil and gas installations and 
pipelines on the United Kingdom (U.K.) continental shelf, see §29 of the 
Petroleum Act 1998.
5. In relation to mine reclamation in the U.S. coal sector, see the federal Sur-
face Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA) (codified as 
amended at 30 U.S.C. §§1201-1211, 1231-1328). And in Alberta’s coal 
mining sector, operators of a coal mine are subject to a duty to reclaim 
the land under §137(1) of the Environmental Protection and Enhancement 
Act, R.S.A. 2000, c E-12.
6. In relation to the decommissioning of nuclear power plants in the United 
States, see 10 C.F.R. §50.75 (2014). For their decommissioning in Canada, 
see the Nuclear Safety and Control Act, S.C 1997, c 9. And for the decom-
missioning of nuclear installations in the U.K., see the Energy Act 2008, c 
32, §45.
7. For instance, decommissioning requirements for renewable energy activities 
in U.S. federal waters are regulated by the Bureau of Ocean Energy Manage-
ment (BOEM) under 30 C.F.R. Part 585. Rehabilitation requirements for 
renewable energy activities on U.S. federal land, such as wind and solar proj-
ects, are regulated by the Bureau of Land Management under §504(d) of the 
Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 and 43 C.F.R. §2805.12 
(2019). In Canada, certain onshore wind projects in Ontario are subject 
to the Renewable Energy Approvals Regulation, O. Reg. 359/09, which 
sets out decommissioning requirements. In Nova Scotia, decommissioning 
and site rehabilitation requirements for marine renewable energy projects 
are set out in §44 of the Marine Renewable-energy Act, S.N.S. 2015, c 32, 
amended by S.N.S. 2017, c 12; 2019, c 34. And in the U.K., under §105(2) 
of the Energy Act 2004, c 20, the Secretary of State for Business, Energy, 
and Industrial Strategy has the discretionary power to require the responsible 
person to submit a program for decommissioning offshore renewable energy 
installations (OREIs) and their associated infrastructure. The decommis-
sioning of onshore renewable energy projects in the U.K., such as wind and 
solar farms, is left to the discretion of local planning authorities to address 
through the imposition of conditions attached to the planning consent (e.g., 
the installation is to be removed when no longer in operation and the land 
restored to its previous use). Ministry of Housing, Communities, and Local 
Government, Guidance: Renewable and Low Carbon Energy (2015), https://
www.gov.uk/guidance/renewable-and-low-carbon-energy (paras. 13 (solar 
farms) and 24 (wind farms)).
tions, protection of the environment and the public will, 
perhaps, be the most important objectives.8
That end-of-life obligations are to be completed in the 
future, sometimes decades after being imposed, exposes 
society and the environment to the risk of the operator 
becoming bankrupt in the interim or simply not having 
the financial capacity or inclination to undertake the works 
when required. This is a common occurrence, as evidenced 
by the vast number of oil and gas wells and mines aban-
doned by bankrupt operators in the United States.9 Where 
an operator does not fulfill their end-of-life obligations, the 
burden falls on other stakeholders in the energy project, 
such as local communities, taxpayers, and the environment.
Financial assurance requirements (FARs)10 are a regula-
tory tool that exhibits potential to prevent this outcome 
from materializing. They necessitate that an operator (or a 
company affiliated with them, such as a parent company) 
evidences ability to pay for the future works.11 When FARs 
are implemented within a legal framework,12 measures 
commonly utilized by operators include surety bonds, let-
ters of credit, or bank guarantees purchased from a third-
party provider, a parent company (corporate) guarantee, a 
self-bond, or cash deposit.13 However, as we shall see in 
8. For instance, in Canada, the Alberta Energy Regulator, the body responsible 
for the regulation of reclamation and remediation activities resulting from 
oil, gas, and coal operations in the province, asserts that “[l]icensees are re-
quired to ensure that wells will not pose any risk to the environment or the 
public once abandoned.” Alberta Energy Regulator (AER), Closure—
Abandonment, Reclamation, and Remediation: Fact Sheet 1 (2014), 
https://www.aer.ca/documents/enerfaqs/Closure_FS.pdf.
9. David A. Dana & Hannah J. Wiseman, A Market Approach to Regulating the 
Energy Revolution: Assurance Bonds, Insurance, and the Certain and Uncer-
tain Risks of Hydraulic Fracturing, 99 Iowa L. Rev. 1523, 1561 (2014). For 
instance, the authors note that in the United States, as of 2014, there were 
an estimated 190,000 abandoned underground petroleum tanks; 57,000 
“orphan” unplugged oil or gas wells; and 557,000 abandoned mine sites. Id.
10. The terms “financial security,” “security deposit,” “financial provision,” “fi-
nancial guarantee,” “financial responsibility,” and “bonding requirements” 
are also used in legal frameworks and the academic literature. While the 
term “financial assurance” is used throughout this Article, these terms may 
be viewed as interchangeable.
11. James Boyd, Financial Responsibility for Environmental Obliga-
tions: Are Bonding and Assurance Rules Fulfilling Their Promise? 
1 (Resources for the Future, Discussion Paper No. 01-42, 2001), https://
media.rff.org/documents/RFF-DP-01-42.pdf.
12. The legal framework itself may prescribe how ability to pay is to be demon-
strated, specifying measures deemed acceptable to satisfy the FARs. This is 
the case in relation to the acceptable means of satisfying FARs in relation to 
the decommissioning of nuclear power plants in the United States. See 10 
C.F.R. §50.75 (2014). Alternatively, FARs may be stated briefly in the leg-
islation but fleshed out in a supplementary guidance document where the 
expectations of the regulator may be set out in greater depth. For example, 
this is the position under the legal framework governing the production of 
nuclear energy in Canada under §24(5) of the Nuclear Safety and Control 
Act, S.C. 1997, c 9 (“A licence may contain any term or condition that the 
Commission considers necessary for the purposes of this Act, including a 
condition that the applicant provide a financial guarantee in a form that is 
acceptable to the Commission.”) The document, Canadian Nuclear Safe-
ty Commission (CNSC), Regdoc-3.3.1, Financial Guarantees for De-
commissioning of Nuclear Facilities and Termination of Licensed 
Activities (2019), http://nuclearsafety.gc.ca/eng/acts-and-regulations/con-
sultation/comment/regdoc3-3-1.cfm, sets out requirements and guidance 
for applicants and licensees regarding the establishment and maintenance of 
financial guarantees. However, often the supplementary guidance document 
is not drafted in prescriptive terms, with discretion being conferred to the 
operator as to how to comply with the FARs.
13. See the case studies in Section II.A for further detail on the types of financial 
assurance measures permitted under FARs in the United States, Canada, 
and the U.K. While insurance will have a limited role to play in relation to 
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Part II, certain measures are less effective than others and 
some are “completely ineffective” in the event of the opera-
tor’s bankruptcy prior to the project’s completion.14 And 
while FARs exist in many frameworks in the coal, oil and 
gas, and nuclear sectors,15 they are often conspicuously 
absent in frameworks governing renewable energy projects, 
with Canada and the U.K. providing ready examples.16
Ultimately, absent or inefficacious FARs may result in 
the regulator being forced to make an unenviable decision 
in the event of an operator’s bankruptcy or unwillingness 
to undertake their end-of-life obligations. In the absence 
of (sufficient) assurance, the regulator has two options: 
undertake the works itself using public funds, or concede 
that they cannot be completed promptly (or at all) at pub-
end-of-life obligations due to their known, foreseen nature, it could cover 
risks associated with environmental damage caused by the activity that is 
discovered upon the site’s closure. The remediation of such damage may be 
part of the end-of-life obligations associated with the site.
14. Jason Malone & Tim Winslow, Financial Assurance: Environmental Protec-
tion as a Cost of Doing Business, 93 N.D. L. Rev. 1, 3 (2018).
15. For instance, in the United States, SMCRA established a nationwide bond-
ing scheme for the surface coal mining sector. 30 U.S.C. §§1259, 1269; 30 
C.F.R. §§800.11-.70 (2014). The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 
requires nuclear power plant operators to provide financial assurance for 
plant decommissioning. 10 C.F.R. §50.75 (2014). BOEM has bonding re-
quirements for the lessee of an OCS oil and gas or sulfur lease. 30 C.F.R. 
§556, subpt. I (2019). In Canada, §24(5) of the Nuclear Safety and Control 
Act, S.C. 1997, c 9, authorizes the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 
(CNSC) to include a condition in a license that the applicant provide a 
financial guarantee in a form that is acceptable to the Commission where 
this is necessary for the purposes of the Act. In the oil and gas sector of 
British Columbia, under §30(1) of the Oil and Gas Activities Act, S.B.C. 
2008, c 36, the Oil and Gas Commission may require a holder or applicant 
to provide security in the amount the Commission requires to ensure the 
performance of an obligation under the Act, a permit, or an authorization. 
In Alberta’s coal mining sector, §84(1) of the Environmental Protection and 
Enhancement Act, R.S.A. 2000, c E-12, enables the regulator to require 
that the responsible person provides “financial or other security and carry 
insurance” with respect to their obligations.
16. In Alberta, the Conservation and Reclamation Directive for Renewable En-
ergy Operations, Sept. 14, 2018, which sets out decommissioning require-
ments applicable to renewable energy projects, does not impose FARs with 
respect to those projects. In Nova Scotia, while the Nova Scotia Department 
of Energy and Mines has a general discretionary power under the Marine 
Renewable-Energy Act, S.N.S. 2015, c 32, amended by S.N.S. 2017, c 12; 
2019, c 34, to require that a license or permit holder of a marine renew-
able energy project provide financial or other security and/or carry insur-
ance, there are no FARs with respect to decommissioning, abandonment, 
and rehabilitation under that Act nor under the Marine Renewable-Energy 
General Regulations, N.S. Reg. 8/2018. In Ontario, the Renewable Energy 
Approvals Regulation, O. Reg. 359/09, which governs certain onshore wind 
projects, does not impose FARs with respect to the decommissioning of 
wind turbines. However, under §132(1) of the Environmental Protection 
Act, R.S.O. 1990, c E.19, the Ministry of the Environment, Conservation, 
and Parks has a discretionary power to include in an approval or order with 
respect to works related to a project a requirement that the person to whom 
the approval is issued or the order is directed provide financial assurance. 
And there appear to be no requirements for provision of financial assurance 
for the decommissioning of renewable energy projects in British Columbia.
 In the U.K. renewable energy sector, the Secretary of State for Busi-
ness, Energy, and Industrial Strategy possesses a discretionary power under 
the Energy Act 2004, c 20, to require that owners/developers provide fi-
nancial assurance for the decommissioning of OREIs, see §§105(2) and 
106(4). Moreover, there are no statutory FARs for the decommissioning 
of onshore renewable energy projects in the U.K., such as wind and solar 
farms. Local planning authorities could, it seems, require that financial 
assurance be made for their decommissioning through the imposition of 
planning conditions under the planning consent. Ministry of Housing, 
Communities, and Local Government, supra note 7. FARs could also form 
part of the lease agreement for the site between the developer and the land-
owner, but this would be determined through the private agreement of the 
parties and the pertinent details are unlikely to enter the public domain.
lic cost due to budgetary limitations.17 While the former 
has serious implications for public revenue, the latter may 
create severe, localized social and environmental impacts. 
These have been experienced in communities and environ-
ments located close to coal mining operations.18
Though of crucial social and environmental importance, 
these are not the focus of this Article. The legal problem 
that we address in this Article concerns a wider effect of 
absent or inefficacious FARs, specifically the potential for 
distortion in trade. This is created by the cost savings they 
afford to individual operators and, indeed, entire subsec-
tors. We characterize this as a form of state subsidization.
The cost savings can be direct and/or indirect. A direct 
saving arises where an operator (or operators generally 
within a subsector) need not incur a cost associated with 
evidencing assurance (e.g., they are not required to pur-
chase a bond or guarantee from a third party or make a 
cash deposit with the regulator). Indirect savings are cre-
ated where an operator is able to abandon all or part of 
their end-of-life obligations upon bankruptcy or following 
the regulator’s acceptance of an operator’s failure to close 
the site as required.19 This “externalization” of costs may, 
for instance, have resulted from the regulator’s tolerance of 
a “high risk” measure, such as self-bonding. This measure 
relies on the operator’s (or its parent company’s) financial 
strength as evidence of ability to pay and does not require 
assets to be set aside to fund the works, making it prone 
to outright failure in the event of bankruptcy.20 As Jason 
Malone and Tim Winslow observe, “[w]hen an operator 
self-bonds and files for bankruptcy, there is often little to 
zero funds for reclamation.”21 While the risk is well recog-
nized, a number of regimes still permit its use.22
17. An exception here would be where an industry fund existed, such as the 
Orphan Fund in Alberta, see Section II.A.2. This provides a source of pri-
vate-sector funding for the costs associated with the end-of-life obligations 
of bankrupt licensees of conventional oil and gas wells. The Orphan Fund 
is financed through levies on operators in the sector, but with increasing 
reliance on loans from the Government of Alberta to aid its work, see infra 
note 93.
18. For instance, Joshua Macey and Jackson Salovaara observe that “the com-
munities affected by coal companies’ bankruptcies bear these costs in the 
form of worse health, poor financial security, and diminished land and water 
quality.” Joshua Macey & Jackson Salovaara, Bankruptcy as Bailout: Coal 
Company Insolvency and the Erosion of Federal Law, 71 Stan. L. Rev. 879, 
904 (2019).
19. There are many examples of bankruptcy law being utilized strategically to 
avoid the equivalent of millions of dollars, sometimes hundreds of millions, 
worth of end-of-life obligations secured by inefficacious FARs. It is estimat-
ed that four of the largest U.S. coal producers have used Chapter 11 to avoid 
around $1.9 billion in abandonment obligations since 2012. Id. at 883. This 
figure does not include the “potentially billions of dollars” in environmental 
liabilities unrelated to SMCRA. Id. n.12.
20. Colin Mackie & Valerie Fogleman, Self-Insuring Environmental Liabilities: 
A Residual Risk-Bearer’s Perspective, 16 J. Corp. L. Stud. 293, 296 (2016). 
See Section II.B, for a more detailed critique of self-bonding.
21. Malone & Winslow, supra note 14, at 4. The authors assert that self-bond-
ing, therefore, “pose[s] a systemic risk to the environment and taxpayers.”
22. For instance, NRC permits licensees of nuclear power reactors to self-bond 
with respect to the costs associated with plant decommissioning. 10 C.F.R. 
§50.75(e)(1)(iii)(C) (2014). A parent company (third-party) guarantee is 
permitted by BOEM’s bonding requirements for the lessee of an OCS oil 
and gas or sulfur lease. 30 C.F.R. §556.905 (2019). And under SMCRA, 
operators that are in adequate financial health can self-bond in the coal 
mining sector. 30 C.F.R. §800.23 (2019). As to the prevalence of their ac-
ceptance in the U.K., see Mackie & Fogleman, supra note 20, at 298.
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That absent or inefficacious FARs can mimic state sub-
sidization of operators’ end-of-life obligations connects an 
issue that many classify as purely environmental to the 
larger economic and political conversation around fairness 
in trade. Stringent FARs, conceived of as a distinct type 
of environmental regulation, have the potential to harm 
the economic competitiveness of a jurisdiction.23 Other 
things being equal, operators trading from jurisdictions 
with stringent FARs will be at a competitive disadvantage 
to those trading from jurisdictions with lax (or no) FARs 
owing to the higher compliance costs of the former.24 This 
raises the concern that jurisdictions may have incentives to 
rely on absent or inefficacious FARs to render their opera-
tors more competitive in the market. It is not just unequal 
global competition that is fostered by absent or ineffica-
cious FARs, but also unequal domestic competition.25 A 
jurisdiction is also unlikely to give up its competitive posi-
tion voluntarily by strengthening its FARs if there is a risk 
that others will not.26
An established means of addressing this type of trade-
related issue is to allocate the pertinent costs to operators 
under the legal framework, then require their internaliza-
tion in line with a “polluter pays” approach. The polluter-
pays principle, originated by the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1972, was the 
approach recommended to Member countries to deal with 
the potential for distortions of trade engendered by state 
subsidization of pollution prevention and control measures 
imposed by public authorities.27 It was built upon the eco-
nomic idea that this could be prevented by ensuring that 
the costs associated with these measures were “reflected in 
the cost” of goods and services that cause pollution in pro-
duction and/or consumption (i.e., internalized).28
Within this particular context, the normative value and 
appeal of such a principle is, perhaps, strongest in the Euro-
pean Union (EU), where it has become a central pillar in 
helping to facilitate the internal market through the EU’s 
rules governing state aid for environmental protection.29 It 
has also emerged as a key legal norm for driving and shap-
ing the EU’s wider environmental law and policy.30 Nev-
ertheless, for reasons outlined below, we find it to provide 
limited normative steer to address the state subsidization 
identified in this Article.
23. Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulation and International Competi-
tiveness, 102 Yale L.J. 2039, 2041 (1993); Kenneth S. Komoroski, The 
Failure of Governments to Regulate Industry: A Subsidy Under the GATT?, 10 
Hous. J. Int’l L. 189, 204 (1988).
24. Stewart, supra note 23, at 2044. The reverse will also be true. Id. at 2056.
25. Colin Mackie & Malcolm Combe, Charges on Land for Environmental Li-
abilities: A Matter of “Priority” for Scotland, 31 J. Envtl. L. 83, 102 (2019).
26. Stewart, supra note 23, at 2045 (“Nations that have adopted less stringent 
standards presumably wish to retain whatever economic benefits, including 
competitive advantages, that such standards confers.”).
27. OECD, C(72)128, Council Recommendation on Guiding Principles Con-
cerning the International Economic Aspects of Environmental Policies 
(1972) [hereinafter OECD 1972 Recommendation].
28. Id. para. 2.
29. Marcin Stoczkiewicz, The Polluter-Pays Principle and State Aid for Environ-
mental Protection, 6 J. Eur. Envtl. & Plan. L. 171, 171 (2009).
30. Nicolas de Sadeleer, EU Environmental Law and the Internal Mar-
ket 57, 461 (2014) (“The polluter pays principle has gradually commanded 
recognition as one of the pillars of the EU’s environmental policy.”).
There is a large literature on FARs for unforeseen envi-
ronmental obligations, such as cleanup and remediation 
requirements arising following an oil spill or an industrial 
accident. More specifically, the capacity of FARs to improve 
the prospect of operators bearing the costs associated with 
such environmental obligations and the shortcomings of 
many of the measures used to evidence ability to pay have 
been considered.31 And the capacity for measures, such 
as insurance, to generate incentives for operators to move 
toward safer environmental practices has been explored.32
However, the deceptively simple, but more challeng-
ing, question regarding the evaluative standard(s) against 
which the function of FARs for end-of-life obligations 
ought to be judged has received little direct and sustained 
scholarly consideration.33 Where this has been consid-
ered, it is often asserted that their function is to require 
operators to “internalize” the costs of these future envi-
ronmental obligations,34 aligning with the logic commonly 
associated with the polluter-pays principle.35 Even where 
more conceptual ideas are touched upon, this is often as a 
brief aside to the primary discussion of FARs for cleanup 
and remediation.36
The aim of this Article is to derive a normative account 
of the function of FARs for end-of-life obligations that 
could inform the design of more efficacious FARs. These 
will help to address the problem of indirect state subsi-
dization described above. We explore three central ques-
tions. First, does the economic idea of cost internalization 
inherent in many “polluter pays”-based approaches to the 
design of environmental law and policy provide a com-
plete and defensible account of the function of FARs 
(the polluter-pays question)? Second, in what ways could 
ideas of legal responsibility, specifically prospective/role-
responsibility, improve that account (the responsibility ques-
tion)? Third, how could these economic and legal ideas be 
31. See, e.g., James Boyd, Financial Assurance Rules and Natural Re-
source Damage Liability: A Working Marriage? (Resources for the 
Future, Discussion Paper No. 01-11, 2001), https://media.rff.org/archive/
files/sharepoint/WorkImages/Download/RFF-DP-01-11.pdf; Boyd, Fi-
nancial Responsibility, supra note 11; Hubert Bocken, Financial Guar-
antees in the Environmental Liability Directive: Next Time Better, 15 Eur. 
Envtl. L. Rev. 1, 13 (2006); Michel G. Faure, Environmental Liability, 
in Tort Law and Economics 247-86 (Michael Faure ed., Edward Elgar 
Publishing 2009); Michael G. Faure, Regulatory Strategies in Environmental 
Liability, in The Regulatory Function of European Private Law 129-
87 (Fabrizio Cafaggi & Horatio Muir Watt eds., Edward Elgar Publishing 
2011); Lucas Bergkamp et al., Financial Security and Insurance, in The EU 
Environmental Liability Directive: A Commentary 118-38 (Lucas 
Bergkamp & Barbara J. Goldsmith eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2013).
32. See, e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham, Environmental Liability and the Limits of 
Insurance, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 942 (1988); Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. 
Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How Insurance Reduces Moral Hazard, 111 
Mich. L. Rev. 197 (2012); Colin Mackie, The Regulatory Potential of Fi-
nancial Security to Reduce Environmental Risk, 26 J. Envtl. L. 189 (2014); 
Zachary C.M. Arnold, Preventing Industrial Disasters in a Time of Climate 
Change: A Call for Financial Assurance Mandates, 41 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 
243 (2017).
33. For the literature that has considered this, see Section III.B and Part V.
34. Boyd, Financial Assurance Rules, supra note 31, at 5; Boyd, Financial 
Responsibility, supra note 11, at 29.
35. Boris N. Mamlyuk, Analyzing the Polluter Pays Principle Through Law and 
Economics, 18 Se. Envtl. L.J. 39, 49 (2009) (“The polluter pays principle 
rests on the theory of cost internalization.”).
36. See, e.g., Boyd, Financial Assurance Rules, supra note 31.
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brought together to inform the design of efficacious FARs 
(the design question)?
Our focus is upon the energy sectors of the United 
States, Canada, and the U.K. owing to the similarity of 
issues raised by their FARs and the ready availability of data 
pertaining to their utilization. However, other jurisdictions 
and other sectors with absent or inefficacious FARs, such as 
hard-rock mining37 and carbon capture and sequestration 
(CCS),38 may also benefit from our findings.
The Article is structured as follows. Part II presents the 
trade-distorting effect that absent or inefficacious FARs for 
end-of-life obligations can have, an issue that has not previ-
ously been identified in the literature. Part III examines the 
polluter-pays question. We argue that while the OECD’s 
conception of that principle emphasizes that important 
trade-related objectives may be achieved through cost 
internalization, on its own, it provides an incomplete 
account of the function of FARs for end-of-life obligations. 
There is substantial conceptual uncertainty as to precisely 
what the economic idea of cost internalization means for, 
and requires from, operators in strict legal terms. Moreover, 
the fact that certain costs have been reflected in the costs 
of producing the energy or extracting the raw sources of 
energy (i.e., internalized by the operator) does not mean 
that the funds needed to complete the works are secure or 
sufficient in the event of the operator’s (or their parent’s) 
bankruptcy. This is essential if FARs are to prove a useful 
regulatory tool. Something more than this “bare” form of 
cost internalization is needed from FARs.
Part IV examines the responsibility question. We argue 
that the first-order function of FARs ought to be to 
empower operators and regulators to discharge the pro-
spective responsibilities ascribed to each of them. From the 
operator’s perspective, this is their duty under the public 
law to perform their end-of-life obligations. From the regu-
lator’s perspective, this is to ensure that this occurs. This 
may be traced to a duty, prevalent in frameworks across the 
energy sector, ascribed to regulators to protect the environ-
ment and human health in exercising their powers. The 
regulator may discharge their duty through obtaining an 
appropriate guarantee from the operator that performance 
will occur.
37. In March 2020, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) re-
ported that in the United States, “[f ]ederal agencies spent, on average, about 
$287 million annually identifying, cleaning up, and monitoring abandoned 
hardrock mines, for a total of about $2.9 billion, from fiscal years 2008 
through 2017” and “[o]f the $2.9 billion in total federal expenditures, ap-
proximately $1 billion was reimbursed by responsible parties,” meaning that 
around $1.9 billion was borne by taxpayers in that period. GAO, GAO-
20-238, Abandoned Hardrock Mines: Information on Number of 
Mines, Expenditures, and Factors That Limit Efforts to Address 
Hazards 22 (2020), https://www.gao.gov/assets/710/705146.pdf.
38. Paul Bailey et al. observe that “financial resources sufficient to cover long-
term liabilities must be available over an indefinite time-frame in order to 
(1)  fulfill CCS’s purpose—permanent storage of CO2 [carbon dioxide]—
which may require indefinite stewardship of CCS sites and (2) ensure that 
human health and the environment are not negatively impacted.” Paul Bai-
ley et al., Can Governments Ensure Adherence to the Polluter Pays Principle 
in the Long-Term CCS Liability Context?, 12 Sustainable Dev. L. & Pol’y 
46, 47 (2012). This would encompass long-term stewardship obligations, 
including performance of water quality monitoring responsibilities. Id. Ef-
ficacious FARs are, of course, one means of ensuring that these stewardship 
responsibilities are performed at the private cost of the operator.
The empowering quality of FARs is, we argue, achieved 
most effectively through ensuring fully funded capital 
reserves are “ring-fenced” from the claims of an operator’s 
creditors prior to operations commencing. This forced seg-
regation of funds emphasizes our second-order function of 
FARs: the facilitation of more productive cost internaliza-
tion. This may generate more rational decisionmaking by 
operators and address distortions in trade. We present our 
account and show how it could inform the design of FARs 
in Part V. Part VI draws conclusions.
II. The Implications of Absent or 
Inefficacious FARs
This part illustrates the trade-distorting effect of absent or 
inefficacious FARs for end-of-life obligations in the energy 
sectors of North America and the U.K. We should be clear 
from the outset that this effect is not peculiar to the energy 
sector. It may be generated in other sectors, such as metal 
mining39 and CCS.40 However, we believe that the pres-
sure levied on FARs for end-of-life obligations as a result 
of the scale and increasing pervasiveness of bankruptcies 
across the energy sector provides the impetus and ratio-
nale for using that sector as a discrete case study of sorts 
to (re)consider their regulatory function.41 There is also the 
concern that the indirect state subsidization of operators 
in the fossil fuel sector hampers transition to cleaner forms 
of energy,42 such as wind, tidal, and solar. Equally, indi-
rect state subsidization of environmental obligations in the 
renewable sector masks the true social cost of the energy 
that it produces. Thus, it is important to draw these issues 
into sharp focus to aid open discussion and reflection upon 
how they can be addressed.
In recent years, bankruptcies of North American and 
U.K. energy companies have been prevalent. There have 
39. For instance, in Ontario, a nickel mining company, Vale Canada Ltd., 
covers $547,167,674 of reclamation liabilities pertaining to seven of its 
mines through satisfying a financial test (i.e., self-bonding), including 
$330,371,149 of such liabilities at a single mine (as of December 31, 2019). 
Ontario Ministry of Energy, Northern Development, and Mines, Financial 
Assurance Table, https://www.mndm.gov.on.ca/en/news/mines-and-miner-
als/financial-assurance-table (last posted Jan. 21, 2020). As of December 
31, 2019, no other mining company operating in the province uses the 
financial test to evidence assurance for its mines. Vale Canada Ltd.’s self-
bonded figure of $547,167,674 equates to 28.6% of all financial assurance 
held by the regulator with respect to mine reclamation in the province. Id. 
The commercial advantage conferred upon Vale Canada Ltd. through this 
ability to self-bond, to the exclusion of other mining companies in the prov-
ince, will be significant.
40. Bailey et al., supra note 38, at 47 (“Many governments across the globe have 
adopted regulatory frameworks that subsidize the long-term liability costs 
associated with CCS. Government subsidization of long-term CCS liabili-
ties transfers a portion of the responsibility to pay for CO2 pollution away 
from the CO2 storage facility owner/operator and onto the public.”).
41. These bankruptcies will have cross-border effects where the organization has 
operations in different countries. For instance, the entry of the Dublin-based 
tidal energy company, OpenHydro, into bankruptcy proceedings resulted 
in its Canadian subsidiary, OpenHydro Technologies Canada, filing for 
bankruptcy protection in July 2019. A valuable asset belonging to the latter 
was a large tidal turbine installed in the Minas Passage in Nova Scotia, see 
Aaron Beswick, Legal Fight Over Open Hydro Continues, Chron. Herald, 
July 11, 2019, https://www.thechronicleherald.ca/business/local-business/
legal-fight-over-open-hydro-continues-331863/.
42. Hyung-Jin Kim, Subsidy, Polluter Pays Principle, and Financial Assistance 
Among Countries, 34 J. World Trade 115, 125 (2000).
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been increasing numbers of casualties in the fossil fuel 
sector owing to cheap natural gas and the falling cost of 
renewable energy, such as solar power and wind.43 In the 
U.S. coal mining sector, Foresight Energy LP filed for 
bankruptcy in March 2020, adding to the wave of bank-
ruptcies in recent years.44 Alberta-based Grande Cache 
Coal entered into bankruptcy proceedings in early 2017.45 
Scottish Coal, formerly the U.K.’s largest coal mining com-
pany, entered into liquidation in 2013.46
In the North American oil and gas sector, between the 
first quarter of 2015 and the first quarter of 2020, there 
were 215 filings for bankruptcy by oil and gas producers.47 
The three largest contributing jurisdictions were Texas 
(98), Delaware (33), and Canada (18).48 The position is 
worsening: 24 oil and gas producers filed for bankruptcy 
in 2017, 28 in 2018, and 42 in 2019.49 This upward trend 
is predicted to continue.50 The North Sea experienced a 
proportionally high share of insolvencies, with an “all-time 
high” of 16 U.K. oil and gas businesses going insolvent in 
2016, with that number expected to rise.51 In early 2020, 
the U.K. oil and gas sector was deemed to be in a “paper-
thin” position.52
The trend is not peculiar to the fossil fuel sector. West-
inghouse Electric Co., which led development of nuclear 
energy in the United States, filed for bankruptcy protec-
tion in April 2017 with debts of $9.8 billion.53 This had 
a “disastrous impact” on its Japanese parent company, 
Toshiba, which is also a major global player in the sector.54 
FirstEnergy Solutions Corp., its subsidiaries, and FirstEn-
ergy Nuclear Operating Co. filed for bankruptcy protec-
tion in March 2018.55 Further bankruptcies in the nuclear 
43. Cecilia Jamasmie, Foresight Energy Joins Ranks of Bankrupt U.S. Coal Com-
panies, Inst. for Energy Econ. & Fin. Analysis, Mar. 11, 2020, https://
ieefa.org/foresight-energy-joins-ranks-of-bankrupt-u-s-coal-companies/.
44. Steven Church et al., Foresight Energy Is Latest U.S. Coal Miner in Bank-
ruptcy, Bloomberg, Mar. 10, 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
articles/2020-03-10/foresight-energy-is-latest-u-s-coal-miner-on-bankrupt-
cy-heap.
45. Reid Southwick, Grande Cache Coal Bankrupt as Town Deals With Declin-
ing Population, Calgary Herald, Feb. 6, 2017, https://calgaryherald.
com/business/local-business/grande-cache-coal-bankrupt-as-town-deals- 
with-declining-population/.
46. Erikka Askeland, Last Scottish-Owned Coal-Mining Company Folds, 
Scotsman, Apr. 20, 2013, https://www.scotsman.com/news-2-15012/
last-scottish-owned-coal-mining-company-folds-1-2903162.




48. Id. at 5.
49. Id. at 10-12.
50. Id. at 2.
51. Stephen Naysmith, Fears More Firms Could Go Bust Before Oil Industry Can 
Recover, Herald, Jan. 2, 2017, https://www.heraldscotland.com/news/ 
14998312.fears-more-firms-could-go-bust-before-oil-industry-can-recover/.
52. OGUK, Business Outlook 2020: Markets & Investment 3 (2020), 
https://oilandgasuk.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/OGUK-Business-
Outlook-2020-Markets-Investments.pdf.
53. Diane Cardwell & Jonathan Soble, Westinghouse Files for Bankruptcy, in 
Blow to Nuclear Power, N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 2017, https://www.nytimes.
com/2017/03/29/business/westinghouse-toshiba-nuclear-bankruptcy.html.
54. Mycle Schneider & Antony Froggatt, The World Nuclear Industry 
Status Report 2019 (2019), https://www.worldnuclearreport.org/The-
World-Nuclear-Industry-Status-Report-2019-HTML.html.
55. Press Release, FirstEnergy, FirstEnergy Announces Agreement in Principle 
With Creditors in FirstEnergy Solutions’ Chapter 11 Proceedings (Apr. 23, 
sector have been predicted.56 We have also witnessed the 
bankruptcy of renewable energy giants, such as Sun Edi-
son Inc.,57 in recent years. In the U.K., there have been 
bankruptcies in the wave energy sector. In late 2014, a 
sector leader, Pelamis Wave Power,58 entered bankruptcy 
proceedings and in October 2015, Aquamarine Power Ltd. 
followed suit.59
A. FARs in the Energy Sector: Case Studies From 
the United States, Canada, and the U.K.
This section examines FARs from the energy sectors of 
the United States, Canada, and the U.K. These pertain to 
the decommissioning of nuclear power reactors (United 
States), the abandonment of conventional oil and gas wells 
(Alberta, Canada), and the decommissioning of offshore 
renewable energy installations (England and Wales). We 
selected these particular frameworks for analysis as they 
exhibit the types of inefficacies common to many FARs 
applicable across the energy sectors of the United States, 
Canada, and the U.K. They include tolerance of “high 
risk” measures and approaches, questionable assumptions 
regarding the amount of assurance to be provided, only 
requiring assurance when an operator’s financial strength 
has deteriorated, and conferring discretion upon a regulator 
to determine whether, in fact, assurance is to be provided at 
all by an operator. Neatly illustrating concrete examples of 
inefficacies, these case studies provide both crucial context 
with respect to regulatory practice across different subsec-
tors and useful empirical evidence to ground our analysis.
1. Decommissioning Nuclear Power Reactors 
in the United States
This subsection examines FARs pertaining to the decom-
missioning of nuclear power reactors in the United States. 
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is the federal 
agency responsible for “protecting the health and safety 
of the public and the environment” through its licens-
ing and regulation of civilian uses of specified radioactive 
material.60 It regulates provision of financial assurance for 
the decommissioning of nuclear power reactors under 10 
C.F.R. Part 50. The costs associated with decommission-
ing can be vast. While the total cost of decommissioning 
a reactor facility depends upon a wide variety of factors 
2018), https://www.firstenergycorp.com/newsroom/news_articles/firstener-
gy-announces-agreement-in-principle-with-creditors-in-f.html.
56. Fred Pearce, Industry Meltdown: Is the Era of Nuclear Power Coming to 
an End?, YaleEnvironment360, May 15, 2017, https://e360.yale.edu/
features/industry-meltdown-is-era-of-nuclear-power-coming-to-an-end.
57. Peg Brickley & Liz Hoffman, SunEdison Files for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy 
Protection, Wall St. J., Apr. 21, 2016, https://www.wsj.com/articles/
sunedison-files-for-chapter-11-bankruptcy-protection-1461247026.
58. Victoria Weldon, Jobs Threat as Cash Troubles Sink Wave Firm, Her-
ald, Nov. 21, 2014, https://www.heraldscotland.com/news/13190634.
jobs-threat-as-cash-troubles-sink-wave-firm/.
59. Aquamarine Power Calls in Administrators, BBC, Oct. 28, 2015, https://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-business-34659324.
60. NRC, Regulation of Radioactive Materials, https://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/
radiation/protects-you/reg-matls.html (last updated Sept. 22, 2017).
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(e.g., type of reactor and its location), it is estimated to cost 
between $280 million and $612 million.61 Three facilities 
in the United States are estimated to cost in excess of $1 
billion to decommission.62
Under §50.75(b), each applicant for, or holder of, an 
operating license must submit a decommissioning report 
certifying that financial assurance for decommissioning 
will be provided in an amount derived from one of two 
methods. First, the amount may be calculated using a 
funding formula, with the sum not being less than NRC-
specified minimum levels.63 This amount is not site-specific 
and so is not intended to reflect the actual cost of decom-
missioning the facility. Second, the licensee may choose to 
provide an amount of assurance based on a cost estimate 
for decommissioning the facility.64 That sum is site-specific 
and usually results in a larger amount of assurance being 
required.65 It is the least popular of the two methods by 
some margin.66 Whichever method is chosen, the amount 
of assurance to be provided must be recalculated annually 
using an adjustment factor.67 A licensee is also required to 
report to NRC, at least every two years, on the status of its 
decommissioning funding.68
The purpose of the FAR is to indicate to NRC how a 
licensee will provide “reasonable assurance that funds will 
be available for the decommissioning process.”69 A wide 
array of acceptable mechanisms for providing assurance are 
specified in §50.75(e). First, a full “prepayment” of cash or 
liquid assets into a segregated account prior to the start of 
operations or transfer of the license.70 Second, a segregated 
fund established and maintained by setting aside funds 
periodically (an “external sinking fund”).71 Third, a surety 
method (such as a surety bond or letter of credit), insur-
ance, or “other guarantee method” that meets specified 
requirements.72 The “other guarantee method” includes 
a parent company guarantee or self-bond where a speci-
fied financial test may be satisfied.73 Fourth, the contrac-
tual obligations of a licensee’s customer(s) may be used to 
evidence assurance where these are sufficient to cover the 
61. NRC, Financial Assurance for Decommissioning, https://www.nrc.gov/waste/
decommissioning/finan-assur.html (last updated July 25, 2019).
62. NRC, 2017 Decommissioning Funding Status Report for Operating 
Power Reactor Licensees (2016), https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1809/
ML18096B543.pdf.
63. 10 C.F.R. §50.75(b)(1) (2014). The minimum levels are specified in 
§50.75(c).
64. Id. §50.75(b)(4).
65. GAO, GAO-12-258, Nuclear Regulation: NRC’s Oversight of Nu-
clear Power Reactors’ Decommissioning Funds Could Be Further 
Strengthened 13 (2012), https://www.gao.gov/assets/590/589923.pdf 
(“NRC expects that its formula estimate may be less than licensees’ site-
specific cost estimates.”).
66. As of December 31, 2016, the licensees of 96% of plants utilized the NRC 
minimum as the amount of assurance to be provided. NRC, 2017 Decom-
missioning Funding Status Report, supra note 62.
67. 10 C.F.R. §50.75(b)(2) (2020).
68. Id. §50.75(f )(1), (2).
69. Id. §50.75(a) (emphasis added).
70. Id. §50.75(e)(1)(i). The deposit must be sufficient to pay decommissioning 
costs by the time permanent termination of operations is expected. Id.
71. Id. §50.75(e)(1)(ii).
72. Id. §50.75(e)(1)(iii).
73. Id. §50.75(e)(1)(iii)(B), (C). However, a self-bond may not be used where 
the applicant or licensee has a parent company holding majority control 
rights in its voting stock. Id.
decommissioning costs.74 Finally, there is broad, catch-
all, “[a]ny other mechanism” acceptable to NRC category, 
whose regulatory tolerability is based on an assessment of 
the “specific circumstances” of the licensee.75 The mecha-
nism must, however, provide funding “equivalent” to the 
listed mechanisms.76 NRC permits mechanisms to be used 
in combination.77
These FARs create some significant risks for the public 
and the environment. First, the policy driving utilization of 
the funding formula generates the real risk of an assurance 
shortfall. The table of minimum amounts in §50.75(c) was 
established in 1988 “as a means to ensure that the bulk of 
funds needed for decommissioning would be available.”78 
As a preliminary point, NRC did not define the term 
“bulk,” making it impossible to determine whether the 
formula is performing as intended.79 More significantly, 
the inference to be taken from NRC’s use of that term, 
defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as the “[g]reater 
part, or, in relation to number, the majority,”80 is that it was 
acknowledged and accepted that an unspecified portion of 
the funds needed for decommissioning would not be cov-
ered by assurance. When considering that it will often cost 
in excess of $500 million to decommission a facility, this 
raises the prospect for what, in pecuniary terms, may be 
deemed a large deficit in decommissioning funding, which 
the licensee may not be in a financial position to remedy.
Second, and relatedly, the U.S. Government Account-
ability Office (GAO) has concluded, somewhat alarmingly, 
that the funding formula “may not reliably estimate ade-
quate decommissioning costs.”81 Writing in 2012, GAO 
was concerned by the fact that NRC could not reliably 
explain its rationale for the cost elements that supported 
the formula and formula-generated cost estimates, and that 
it had not performed a risk analysis on the formula.82 GAO 
discovered a “wide range of differences” between amounts 
derived through the formula and site-specific cost esti-
mates (SSCEs).83 This is concerning because, as of Decem-
ber 31, 2016, the licensees of 96% of plants have utilized 
the funding formula to derive the amount of assurance to 
be provided.84 Only four of the 100 plants listed in the 
2017 Decommissioning Funding Status Report had presented 
an SSCE.85 SSCEs had some of the largest figures on the 
list by some margin, with two of the facilities estimated 
74. Id. §50.75(e)(1)(v). All proceeds from the contracts are to be deposited in 




78. NRC, Regulatory Improvements for Power Reactors Transitioning 
to Decommissioning: Regulatory Basis Document F-2 (2017) (RIN 
No. 3150-AJ59; NRC Docket ID NRC-2015-0070) (emphasis added), 
https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1721/ML17215A010.pdf.
79. GAO, supra note 65, at 13.
80. “bulk, n.1”. OED Online (Oxford Univ. Press, Mar. 2020) (emphasis add-
ed), https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/24472?rskey=aXgtpy&result=1 (last 
visited Mar. 31, 2020).
81. GAO, supra note 65, at 13.
82. Id. at 15.
83. Id. at 14.
84. NRC, 2017 Decommissioning Funding Status Report, supra note 62.
85. Id.
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to cost more than $1 billion to decommission.86 Thus, the 
true cost to licensees of decommissioning plants that have 
provided a level of assurance based on the funding formula 
is likely to be far larger than the cost listed.
Third, with around 70% of licensees permitted to accu-
mulate decommissioning funds over the operational life of 
their plants,87 entry into bankruptcy proceedings prior to 
full accumulation of funds will likely result in an assurance 
shortfall. The scale of that shortfall will be dictated by how 
early the plant closes. NRC asserts that if a licensee “per-
manently shuts down its reactor prematurely, it will need to 
accumulate any shortfall in decommissioning funds (less 
future estimated earnings).”88 This is easier said than done, 
particularly in light of their being insolvent. The licensee 
may just not have the financial capacity to “plug” the gap. 
We are beginning to witness this type of risk materializ-
ing. When FirstEnergy Solutions Corp., its subsidiaries, 
and FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co. filed for bank-
ruptcy protection in March 2018, a 2017 estimate placed 
decommissioning costs for its three nuclear plants in Ohio 
at US$5.4 billion against a (then) current decommission-
ing fund (i.e., assurance) level of only US$2.5 billion.89 
This equated to a shortfall in decommissioning funding of 
US$2.9 billion.
2. Abandonment of Conventional Oil and Gas 
Wells in Alberta, Canada
This subsection examines FARs pertaining to the aban-
donment of conventional oil and gas wells in Alberta. The 
province is the largest oil and natural gas producer in Can-
ada, possessing the third largest crude oil reserves in the 
world.90 The Alberta Energy Regulator (AER) is respon-
sible for regulating the life cycle of oil, oil sands, natural 
gas, and coal projects in the province “in a manner that 
protects public safety and the environment, while ensuring 
that the regulatory system is as efficient as possible.”91
The AER uses two tools to manage liabilities relating to 
conventional oil and gas wells. The first, the Orphan Fund, 
is “remedial” in nature.92 It is financed primarily through 
levies made by the AER against licensees,93 and is adminis-
86. Id.
87. NRC, Backgrounder on Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants, https://www.
nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/decommissioning.html (last 
updated Aug. 15, 2018).
88. NRC, Standard Review Plan on Power Reactor Licensee Financial 
Qualifications and Decommissioning Funding Assurance 17 (1999) 
(NUREG-1577, Rev. 1), https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/
nuregs/staff/sr1577/r1/sr1577r1.pdf.
89. Schneider & Froggatt, supra note 54.
90. World Energy Cities Partnership (WECP), Member Cities: Calgary, Canada, 
https://energycities.org/member-cities/calgary-canada (last visited May 4, 
2020).
91. AER, What We Do, https://www.aer.ca/providing-information/about-the-
aer/what-we-do.html (last visited May 4, 2020).
92. Vanessa Alboiu & Tony R. Walker, Pollution, Management, and Mitigation 
of Idle and Orphaned Oil and Gas Wells in Alberta, Canada, 191 Envtl. 
Monitoring & Assessment 611, 621 (2019).
93. Orphan Well Association (OWA), Welcome to the Orphan Well Association, 
http://www.orphanwell.ca/ (last visited May 4, 2020). However, in 2017, 
the Government of Alberta provided a loan of $235 million Canadian dol-
lars (CAD) to the OWA “to accelerate the reclamation of oil and gas well 
sites that no longer have a responsible owner,” which was extended by a fur-
tered by the Orphan Well Association (OWA).94 The OWA 
utilizes these funds to pay for the suspension, abandon-
ment, remediation, and reclamation of a well, facility, or 
pipeline where a licensee or a party with a working interest 
becomes defunct (e.g., bankrupt).95 Its inventory is large 
and predicted to grow.96 As of March 23, 2020, the OWA 
had 2,789 wells for abandonment, 233 facilities for decom-
missioning, 4,113 pipeline segments for abandonment, and 
3,331 sites for reclamation.97
The second, the Licensee Liability Rating (LLR) Pro-
gram, is purportedly a “preventive tool.”98 It governs most 
conventional upstream oil and gas wells, facilities, and 
pipelines in Alberta.99 The program’s purpose is to “prevent 
the costs to suspend, abandon, remediate, and reclaim a 
well, facility, or pipeline . . . from being borne by the public 
of Alberta should a licensee become defunct, and minimize 
the risk to the Orphan Fund posed by the unfunded liability 
of licensees.”100 The inference is that its purpose is not to 
ensure that the licensee can pay for these costs, but to pre-
vent the public from having to pay. The difference is subtle 
but important in helping us to understand the program’s 
underlying logic. It places great importance—perhaps 
unrealistically—on the adequacy of the Orphan Fund in 
terms of financing, human capacity, and technical capa-
bilities to deliver on this goal.
The liability management rating (LMR) underpins the 
program. This is the ratio of a licensee’s eligible deemed 
assets to its deemed liabilities arising under specified regula-
tory programs.101 The LMR, calculated monthly, is designed 
to assess a licensee’s ability to address its suspension, aban-
donment, remediation, and reclamation liabilities.102 If 
a licensee’s deemed liabilities exceed its deemed assets 
(including security deposits made), it is held to have “a 
security-adjusted LMR” below 1.0 and is required to pro-
vide the AER with a security deposit “for the difference.”103 
Only cash and letters of credit can be used.104 The deposit 
ther $100 million CAD in March 2020. Government of Alberta, Upstream 
Oil and Gas Liability and Orphan Well Inventory, https://www.alberta.ca/
upstream-oil-and-gas-liability-and-orphan-well-inventory.aspx (last visited 
May 4, 2020).
94. The OWA is an independent nonprofit organization that operates under the 
delegated legal authority of the AER. OWA, supra note 93.
95. AER, Directive 006: Licensee Liability Rating (LLR) Program and Licence 
Transfer Process 5 (Feb. 17, 2016), https://www.aer.ca/documents/direc-
tives/Directive006.pdf.
96. In a presentation to a private audience in Calgary in February 2018, the vice 
president of closure and liability for the AER, Rob Wadsworth, disclosed 
that liabilities from conventional wells were “getting larger” due to an 
increasing number of licensees with “questionable financial capacity to 
meet closure obligations.” Mike De Souza et al., Cleaning Up Alberta’s 
Oilpatch Could Cost $260 Billion, Internal Documents Warn, Global 
News, Nov. 21, 2018, https://globalnews.ca/news/4617664/cleaning-up-
albertas-oilpatch-could-cost-260-billion-regulatory-documents-warn/.
97. Legacy wells under long-term care and custody are excluded from the 2,789 
wells for abandonment figure. OWA, Orphan Inventory, http://www.or-
phanwell.ca/about/orphan-inventory/ (last visited May 4, 2020).
98. Alboiu & Walker, supra note 92, at 10.
99. AER, Directive 006, supra note 95, at 3 (emphasis added).
100. Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
101. Id. at 3.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 4. The AER is entitled to collect security deposits under Parts 1.1 and 
16.6 of the Oil and Gas Conservation Regulations, A.R. 151/71.
104. AER, Directive 068: ERCB Security Deposits 3 (Sept. 17, 2010), https://
www.aer.ca/documents/directives/Directive068.pdf.
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is required to bring the licensee’s LMR back to above 1.0 in 
an attempt to reduce the likelihood that its liabilities will 
need to be borne by the Orphan Fund.105
There are a number of significant problems associated 
with the LLR program. We shall sketch four here. First, 
the program relies entirely upon a licensee’s demonstration 
of its financial strength as evidence of ability to pay for 
its obligations. This renders it susceptible to issues associ-
ated with how financial strength is determined. The LMR 
is based on information self-reported by licensees to the 
AER,106 meaning that if licensees, deliberately or other-
wise, undervalue their liabilities or overvalue their assets, 
then the ratio gives an entirely misleading picture of their 
financial position.107 Second, security (i.e., financial assur-
ance) need only be provided to the AER when the licensee’s 
LMR falls below 1.0 and this is only to correct the LMR 
(i.e., bring it back to >1.0), not to cover the estimated cost 
of undertaking the works. Indeed, the LMR was intended 
to incentivize licensees to undertake abandonment and 
reclamation in a timely fashion to maintain an LMR of 
>1.0 and so avoid the need to make a security deposit.108 
There is, however, the clear risk that by the time their LMR 
falls below 1.0, they may not have the ability to make the 
deposit. If its financial position is weak, it is unlikely to 
obtain a letter of credit upon reasonable terms from a third-
party provider.109 The requirement for a large cash deposit 
may push it closer to bankruptcy.
Third, “deemed assets” are calculated using “netbacks,” 
a provincial industry average.110 The LMR assumes that all 
operations are equally profitable.111 This is unlikely to be 
the case. Technical, site-specific difficulties associated with 
accessing the resource, low production quantities, and/
or imprudent management of the well are all factors that 
can render licensees’ operations unprofitable.112 Fourth, 
“deemed liabilities” are those arising under particular regu-
latory programs. The figure only covers the estimated costs 
of abandoning and reclaiming wells, not the full range of 
the licensee’s financial liabilities, such as debts and other 
legal liabilities.113 It therefore provides a very restricted pic-
ture of the licensee’s liabilities. Thus, to conclude, the LMR 
105. AER, Directive 006, supra note 95, at 4. The AER’s requirements with re-
spect to the form, use, and refund of security deposits provided under a 
liability management program are in Directive 068.
106. AER, Liability Management Programs Results Report January 2020, 
at 1 (2020), https://www.aer.ca/regulating-development/project-closure/li-
ability-management-programs-and-processes/liability-management-rating-
and-reporting.html.
107. This practice is rife in the U.S. coal mining sector. See Macey & Salovaara, 
supra note 18, at 934 (“coal companies engage in financial gimmickry by 
overvaluing assets, undervaluing liabilities, or pushing liabilities off balance 
sheet in order to appear solvent and continue operating”).
108. Barry Robinson, Ecojustice, The Inactive Well Compliance Pro-
gram: Alberta’s Latest Attempt to Bring the Inactive Well Prob-
lem Under Control 5 (2014), https://ecojustice.ca/wp-content/up-
loads/2014/12/IWCP-Paper-FINAL-20-Nov-2014.pdf.
109. Mackie & Fogleman, supra note 20, at 296.
110. Under AER Directive 006, supra note 95, at 3, “netback” is defined as “earn-
ings before interest, taxes, and depreciation and is equal to gross margin 
(midstream revenue less cost of goods sold) less direct operating costs and 
applicable general and administrative expenses.”
111. Robinson, supra note 108, at 5.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 6.
overestimates assets and underestimates liabilities and so is 
unable to identify operators that are a financial risk to the 
program and so to Albertans.
The data paints a dismal picture of the program’s effi-
cacy. As of January 4, 2020,114 of the 735 licensees evalu-
ated, 355 were below the threshold of 1.0.115 This means 
that 48% of licensees are considered—according to the 
logic of the program—unable to address their suspension, 
abandonment, remediation, and reclamation liabilities. 
However, as we have seen, an LMR of greater than 1.0 can-
not ensure that a licensee is able to meet these liabilities due 
to the way deemed assets and deemed liabilities are calcu-
lated. Of greater concern was the fact that the 735 licensees 
have total estimated liabilities of $30,646,836,270, with 
only $227,371,440 of security deposits held by the AER.116 
Thus, the deposits cover less than 1% of total estimated 
liabilities (0.74%). More than 99% of total estimated lia-
bilities, amounting to $30,419,464,830, have no security 
attached to them.
A senior official from the AER has disclosed that the 
true cost of cleaning up Alberta’s conventional oil and gas 
wells will be closer to $100 billion.117 The financial impli-
cations of this regulatory model are severe, and look set 
to worsen.118 However, inactive, suspended, and orphaned 
wells also pose risks for surface, soil, and groundwater con-
tamination and methane gas leakage that contributes to 
greenhouse gas emissions.119
3. Decommissioning Offshore Renewable Energy 
Installations in English and Welsh Waters
This subsection examines FARs pertaining to the decom-
missioning of offshore renewable energy installations and 
their related electric lines (collectively, OREIs) in English 
and Welsh waters. The statutory decommissioning scheme 
for these OREIs, including wind farms and wave and tidal 
energy devices, is contained in the Energy Act 2004.120 The 
Act does not prescribe technical requirements for decom-
missioning, the stated logic for this being that industry 
best practice may be expected to develop over time as expe-
rience grows.121 The Secretary of State for Business, Energy, 
114. While the AER publishes monthly updates on the LMR Program, January 
2020 was the last month that figures attributable to “Total Estimated Liabil-
ities” and “Total LMR Security Held” were released by the AER. These im-
portant figures are, for some reason, excised from the February 2020 report 
and the monthly reports thereafter and no longer appear on the monthly 
updates. We use the January 2020 figures due to their inclusion of this valu-
able, additional information and the fact that they may be considered, in 
relative terms, to be up to date.
115. AER, Liability Management Programs Results Report, supra note 106, 
at 1.
116. Id.
117. De Souza et al., supra note 96.
118. See supra note 96.
119. Alboiu & Walker, supra note 92, at 2.
120. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 1982 
outlines the U.K.’s international obligations to decommission disused in-
stallations. Article 60(3) specifies the need for “any [abandoned or disused] 
installations and structures” in the exclusive economic zone to be “removed” 
to ensure safety of navigation.
121. Department of Business, Energy, and Industrial Strategy (BEIS), 
Decommissioning of Offshore Renewable Energy Installations Un-
der the Energy Act 2004: Guidance Notes for Industry (England 
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and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) has discretionary powers 
under the Act to request decommissioning programs122 and 
security123 (i.e., assurance) from owners/developers for the 
decommissioning of OREIs. Where requested, a decom-
missioning program must, inter alia, set out measures to 
be taken for decommissioning the OREI and include an 
estimate of the likely expenditure (i.e., costs).124 If the Sec-
retary of State does require the owner/developer to provide 
assurance, this will be as a “condition” of the decommis-
sioning program’s approval.125
Where assurance is required, its “purpose” is to enable 
BEIS to decommission the OREI where the owner has 
failed to and where there are no other parties that can be 
held liable.126 The context is that as a signatory to the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 
the U.K. government is the “decommissioner of last 
resort” and so bears ultimate responsibility for the associ-
ated costs.127 These may be significant. In a 2018 report 
commissioned by BEIS, the total cost of decommission-
ing offshore wind farms alone in the U.K. until 2045 was 
estimated at between £1.28 billion and £3.64 billion, with 
BEIS’ liability expected to be in the region of £1.03 billion 
and £2.94 billion.128 The Crown Estate, which issues leases 
and licenses for OREIs, and the Scottish government are 
potentially liable for the balance.129 Of the 37 wind farms 
modeled under the report, 25 were BEIS’ responsibility.130
BEIS’ guidance on acceptable means of evidencing 
assurance is, on the face of it, robust. Upfront cash, cash 
reserving, letters of credit, bank guarantees, and perfor-
mance bonds will be accepted.131 Reserving cash in one’s 
and Wales) 25 (2019), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/govern-
ment/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/788051/decom-
missioning-offshore-renewable-energy-installations-guidance.pdf.
122. More specifically, under §105(2), the Secretary of State “may” require a per-
son who is responsible for the OREI to submit a program for decommis-
sioning the relevant object (a decommissioning program). Under §105A(1), 
the Secretary of State “may” give a notice to a body corporate associated 
with the responsible person where the Secretary of State “is not satisfied 
that adequate arrangements (including financial arrangements) have been 
made by the responsible person to ensure that a satisfactory decommission-
ing program will be carried out.” This would, of course, be unnecessary had 
the Secretary of State required the responsible person to provide appropriate 
financial assurance.
123. Under §106(4), the Secretary of State has the power to approve the decom-
missioning program subject to conditions, including a condition that the 
person who submitted the program provides such security (i.e., financial 
assurance) as may be specified by the Secretary of State.
124. Energy Act 2004, §105(8).
125. Id. §106(4).
126. BEIS, Decommissioning of Offshore Renewable Energy Installa-
tions, supra note 121, at 29.
127. Id. at 33.
128. BEIS, Cost Estimation and Liabilities in Decommissioning Offshore 
Wind Installations: Public Report, Final 33 (2018), https://assets.
publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach-
ment_data/file/725316/Cost_and_liabilities_of_OWF_decommission-
ing_public_report.pdf. The total decommissioning liability in real (2017) 
terms was forecast to be £1.82 billion. This did not account for inflation. 
However, the figures above were provided to reflect a range of uncertainty. 
The estimate was for the decommissioning costs associated with 37 offshore 
wind farms at various stages of development, with some in construction and 
others preconstruction. Id.
129. Id. at 1, 33.
130. Id. at 13.
131. BEIS, Decommissioning of Offshore Renewable Energy Installa-
tions, supra note 121, at 35.
own accounts is not considered an acceptable approach,132 
and parent company guarantees will only be accepted in 
“exceptional” circumstances.133 The guidance indicates 
that while a secure, segregated decommissioning fund that 
accrues early in, or during the middle of, the life of an 
installation is likely to be acceptable, one that accrues late 
into the operating life will not.134 Nevertheless, as with 
NRC’s regulation of nuclear reactor decommissioning, 
there is still the risk that the funds will not have accumu-
lated in full should the owner/developer become bankrupt 
before the scheduled end of the OREIs’ operational life. 
Crucially, this guidance, which will facilitate more secure 
assurance than, for instance, NRC’s requirements set out 
above, will be superfluous where the Secretary of State 
does not exercise its discretion to require assurance from 
owners/developers.
There are several risks associated with the framework. 
First, the discretion conferred upon BEIS to require own-
ers/developers to provide financial assurance is problematic 
and creates ideal conditions for indirect state subsidiza-
tion. While BEIS acknowledged that financial assurance 
reduced the risk of owners/developers defaulting on their 
liabilities, it asserted that, “[a]t the same time, we do not 
want to hinder the development of [OREIs].”135 The message 
is clear and goes some way to explaining the rationale for 
the discretionary nature of the framework: FARs can and 
do hinder the development of OREIs and this was not 
desirable. As the U.K. government is ultimately respon-
sible for decommissioning OREIs in English and Welsh 
waters, taxpayers will bear the financial burden of this 
policy position.
Second, the breadth of the cost range (between £1.03 
billion and £2.94 billion) in relation to the estimated liabil-
ity of BEIS for decommissioning offshore wind farms in 
the U.K. raises serious concerns as to the ability of owners/
developers to estimate their own decommissioning costs 
reliably. The figure they present will drive decisionmaking 
around the amount of assurance that may be demanded 
from them. The wide range was put down to the nascent 
nature of the industry, the lack of experience in undertak-
ing large-scale decommissioning projects, and a variety of 
uncertainties, including the highly volatile nature of vessel 
rates and the processes, tools, and techniques used to carry 
out the decommissioning work.136 These uncertainties go 
to the very heart of constructing a reliable, defensible esti-
mate. This means that the prospect of the owner/developer 
providing a level of assurance sufficient to meet the costs of 
decommissioning an OREI must be considered to be low. 
There is the risk of a significant assurance shortfall.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 37.
134. Id.
135. BEIS, Consents and Planning Applications for National Energy Infrastruc-
ture Projects (Guidance on Regulations Covering New Power Generating 
Plants and Wayleaves) (emphasis added), https://www.gov.uk/guidance/
consents-and-planning-applications-for-national-energy-infrastructure-
projects#offshore-wind (last updated Sept. 6, 2018).
136. BEIS, Cost Estimation and Liabilities in Decommissioning Offshore 
Wind Installations, supra note 128, at 1, 16, 33.
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Third, BEIS asserts that “[t]here may be a number of 
acceptable forms of security,” with proposals being “con-
sidered on a case by case basis.”137 And its guidance makes 
clear that the type of security likely to be acceptable will 
depend, inter alia, upon the “financial strength of those 
responsible for decommissioning.”138 However, given the 
well-known risk that an operator’s financial deterioration 
poses for its ability to perform its environmental obliga-
tions, it is not instantly apparent why this ought to be a 
relevant criterion in the decision as to the acceptability of 
a measure. It focuses on present-day ability to pay, not the 
ability of the owner/developer to pay in what is likely to 
be the distant future. The latter is, of course, the issue of 
central importance.
B. Absent or Inefficacious FARs as 
Indirect State Subsidization
This section will draw into sharp focus the trade-subsi-
dizing effects of absent or inefficacious FARs. Tradition-
ally, subsidies at the domestic level have been understood 
as financial assistance by the state to the private sector 
through, for instance, government loans at preferential 
rates, direct capital investments, and forgiveness of govern-
ment debt.139 However, commentators have contended that 
the term “subsidy” ought to be construed more broadly to 
include indirect forms of assistance.140 This could encom-
pass affording cost savings to the private sector through 
artificially low environmental standards or lax enforcement 
of them.141
Indeed, “interventions” by the state that “mitigate the 
charges . . . normally included in the budget of an under-
taking” have been held by the Court of Justice of the EU 
to amount to “aid” for the purposes of the EU’s state aid 
rules.142 These rules delimit the parameters of the assis-
tance that EU Member States may lawfully provide to their 
domestic undertakings. While such “interventions” were 
not subsidies “in the strict sense of the word,” they were “of 
the same character and have the same effect.”143
137. Id. at 35.
138. Id. (emphasis added).
139. Kim, supra note 42, at 120; de Sadeleer, supra note 30, at 436.
140. Richard J. King, Trade and the Environment: European Lessons for North 
America, 14 UCLA J. Envtl. L. & Pol’y 209, 222 (1996); Kim, supra note 
42, at 120; de Sadeleer, supra note 30, at 436, 439, 440; Patrice L. Simms, 
Furtive Subsidies: Reframing Fossil Fuel’s Regulatory Exceptionalism, 35 Va. 
Envtl. L.J. 420, 420-21 (2017).
141. King, supra note 140, at 222; Kim, supra note 42, at 120.
142. Case C-126/01, Ministre de L’Économie, des Finances et de L’Industrie v. 
GEMO SA, 1 C.M.L.R. 9, para. 28 (2004). Article 107(1) of the con-
solidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union sets out the EU’s position on state aid:
Save as otherwise provided in the Treaties, any aid granted by a 
Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever 
which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring cer-
tain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far 
as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the 
internal market.
143. Case C-126/01, 1 C.M.L.R. 9, at para. 28. The publication of guidance by 
the regulator setting out acceptable approaches for evidencing assurance, 
such as self-bonding or parent company guarantees, affects the course of 
the operator’s ultimate ability to undertake their end-of-life obligations at 
its own private cost and, therefore, ought to be deemed to amount to an 
The implementation of sector-specific exclusions, exemp-
tions, and special conditions that “lighten” the regula-
tory burden of an operator or operators would also be 
pertinent here.144 These are, for Patrice Simms, “a special 
and distinct class of industry subsidy” that is “paid for by 
the communities who bear the burden of the impaired 
natural resource.”145 This could constitute an exemption 
from a regulatory obligation or its financing, such as the 
obligation to pay a guarantee—or, through analogy, to 
provide financial assurance—or a public authority pay-
ing for costs that would normally fall on an operator 
(e.g., end-of-life obligations).146 John Dernbach draws 
these ideas together with the observation that “external-
ized costs”—a likely consequence of such exemptions—
provide an indirect subsidy that may give the benefitting 
operator(s) a trade advantage.147
Absent or inefficacious FARs afford cost savings to the 
private sector, and thereby exhibit a trade-subsidizing 
effect, in three distinct ways. First, where there are no 
FARs or where regulatory discretion is exercised not to 
require assurance from them, operators are spared the 
expense of providing assurance (e.g., purchasing a prod-
uct, such as a surety bond, from a third party or mak-
ing cash deposits in a segregated account). Or they may 
be spared expense until their financial position deterio-
rates below a tolerable level (e.g., the LMR in Alberta), 
at which point assurance may be required. These provide 
examples of exemptions that lighten the regulatory bur-
den of a specific sector, as articulated by Simms.148 Given 
the large costs often associated with performing end-of-
life obligations,149 the savings to an operator associated 
with not being required to provide assurance can be sig-
nificant. It represents capital that can be used elsewhere 
in their business to enhance its profitability.
This failure to demand assurance creates the real pros-
pect of indirect state subsidization. As we have seen, the 
security deposits—provided by operators once their LMR 
falls below 1.0—held by the AER as of January 2020 cover 
less than 1% of total estimated liabilities, leaving more than 
99% of the liabilities ($30,419,464,830) with no security 
attached to them.150 The true extent of the liabilities has 
“intervention.” So too should the exercise of discretion by a regulator not to 
demand assurance from an operator.
144. King, supra note 140, at 222; Simms, supra note 140, at 420-21.
145. Simms, supra note 140, at 420-21, 429.
146. de Sadeleer, supra note 30, at 436, 439, 440.
147. John C. Dernbach, Sustainable Development as a Framework for National 
Governance, 49 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1, 59 (1998).
148. Simms, supra note 140, at 420-21.
149. In relation to the nuclear sector, see Section II.A.1. While in the U.S. coal 
mining sector, Alpha Natural Resources, formerly the fourth largest coal 
producer in the United States, entered bankruptcy in August 2015 with a to-
tal of $655 million in reclamation liabilities ($411 million in Wyoming and 
$244 million in West Virginia). Macey & Salovaara, supra note 18, at 919. 
End-of-life obligations can also be expensive in the renewable sector. For in-
stance, Minnesota-based Xcel Energy estimates that it will cost $71 million 
(in 2019 dollars) to decommission the 134 wind turbines in operation at 
its Noble facility. The Cost of Decommissioning Wind Turbines Is Huge, Inst. 
for Energy Res., Nov. 1, 2019, https://www.instituteforenergyresearch.
org/renewable/wind/the-cost-of-decommissioning-wind-turbines-is-huge.
150. AER, Liability Management Programs Results Report, supra note 106, 
at 1.
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been put at closer to $100 billion.151 While, in theory, the 
OWA shoulders the burden of dealing with orphaned wells, 
increasingly this is being achieved with the support of large 
loans from the Government of Alberta.152 A senior figure at 
the AER has indicated that the number of licensees with 
“questionable” financial capacity to meet their obligations 
is growing.153 Thus, as the number of orphaned wells can be 
expected to increase, the public funding needed to bolster 
the OWA can also be expected to increase. This injection of 
public funds directly subsidizes the OWA’s activities, indi-
rectly subsidizing the sector.
Similarly, in the U.K., there is no requirement under the 
Petroleum Act 1998 for all operators to provide assurance 
for the decommissioning of offshore oil and gas installa-
tions and submarine pipelines.154 The Secretary of State 
“may” require assurance where the responsible person is 
deemed incapable of carrying out their obligations under 
an approved abandonment program.155 But there is no legal 
requirement for the responsible person to submit such a 
program, unless the Secretary of State so demands.156 This 
is discretion built upon discretion.
The result is that in January 2019, against estimated 
future decommissioning costs to operators of between £45 
billion and £77 billion, BEIS had only required operators 
to set aside £844 million in assurance.157 This means that 
the assurance held by BEIS only covers between 1.88% 
and 1.1% of the sector’s total estimated liabilities. The 
crucial context is, as we have seen, that the U.K. govern-
ment bears ultimate responsibility for decommissioning 
these installations and pipelines under UNCLOS 1982.158 
Where the state performs the obligations of a bankrupt 
operator using public funds, then it indirectly subsidizes 
the energy project.
Second, a cost saving may be created for an operator 
where the level of assurance accumulated by them at the 
point at which they enter bankruptcy is insufficient to 
cover their end-of-life obligations. The shortfall is the saving 
to the operator. The obvious risk with a shortfall is that the 
costs associated with unfulfilled obligations will become 
“externalized” upon the operator’s bankruptcy. Either they 
will be borne by society through the deployment of public 
funds, or by the environment itself through reduced envi-
151. De Souza et al., supra note 96.
152. See, e.g., supra note 93 (the Government of Alberta has provided loans of 
$335 million CAD to the OWA in recent years to aid the reclamation of 
orphan sites).
153. De Souza et al., supra note 96.
154. BEIS, Guidance Notes: Decommissioning of Offshore Oil and Gas 
Installations and Pipelines 115 (2018) (“In some circumstances, where 
there is only one or a small number of operators in a field, the Secretary 
of State may enter into a DSA [decommissioning security agreement] or 
other trust or finance deed or instrument directly with these parties to ob-
tain security.”) (emphasis added), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/760560/De-
com_Guidance_Notes_November_2018.pdf.
155. Petroleum Act 1998, §38(4)-(4A).
156. Id. §29(1).
157. National Audit Office, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor 
General, Oil and Gas in the UK—Offshore Decommissioning 4 
(2019) (HC 1870 Session 2017-2019), https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2019/01/Oil-and-gas-in-the-UK-offshore-decommissioning.
pdf.
158. UNCLOS, Dec. 10, 1982, art. 60(3), 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
ronmental quality where the regulator does not perform 
them.159 This is the indirect state subsidization.
The shortfall may be caused by a variety of factors. 
The method used to determine the amount of assurance 
required may be unreliable, such as NRC’s permitted use by 
licensees of the funding formula. There, the cost of decom-
missioning will likely exceed the industry minimum level 
of assurance provided for 96% of plants.160 Or, utilizing 
the discretion afforded by the legislation, the regulator may 
permit funds to accumulate in a segregated account across 
the operational lifetime of the site. The bankruptcy of the 
operator prior to the full accumulation of funds would 
result in the funds set aside being insufficient to meet the 
estimated costs of the end-of-life obligations. The earlier 
the operator’s bankruptcy occurred in the site’s operational 
life, the greater the likely assurance shortfall.
The energy sector is replete with examples of assurance 
shortfall. For instance, the bankruptcy of FirstEnergy Solu-
tions Corp., its subsidiaries, and FirstEnergy Nuclear Oper-
ating Co. and the estimated shortfall of US$2.9 billion in 
its assurance for the decommissioning of its power reactors 
provides a somewhat stark illustration. And in Canada, a 
March 2019 report highlighted the shortfall of assurance 
provided by five recently bankrupt operators in the oil and 
gas sector of British Columbia.161 With total estimated res-
toration costs of $85,695,000, collectively, these operators 
had only provided security deposits of $3,225,000 to the 
Oil and Gas Commission.162 This resulted in a shortfall of 
$82,470,000.163 A single operator, Terra Energy Corp., was 
responsible for $53,750,000 of it.164
A third means of creating savings for operators is where 
legislators explicitly permit, or regulators accept, self-bond-
ing and parent company (corporate) guarantees as evidence 
of compliance with FARs. While some frameworks explic-
itly prohibit one or both of these measures,165 they continue 
to be tolerated in many others despite the known risks.166 
This third point connects with the previous two points, 
in the sense that the failure of these measures is likely to 
result in insufficient funds being available to perform the 
works (i.e., an assurance shortfall will be created). When 
this occurs, the prospect for indirect state subsidization 
arises. However, it ought to be viewed as a point separate to 
the absence of FARs, inaccurate estimations of the amount 
of assurance required, and inadequate fund accumulation. 
This is due to the risk of their outright failure and the lack 
159. The exception here would be where there was an industry fund, such as the 
Orphan Fund in Alberta, that would take on the financial responsibilities 
for the abandonment obligations of a defunct operator. See Section II.A.2.
160. See infra note 184.
161. Office of the Auditor General of British Columbia, The BC Oil 
and Gas Commission’s Management of Non-Operating Oil and Gas 





165. For instance, under the framework governing financial guarantees for de-
commissioning of nuclear facilities in Canada, parent company guarantees 
are not considered an acceptable financial assurance measure. CNSC, Reg-
doc-3.3.1, supra note 12, at sec. 4.7.
166. As to the prevalence of their acceptance, see supra note 22.
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of a pecuniary cost for the operator (or their parent) when 
they are utilized to satisfy FARs.
There are two principal cost savings for operators (or 
their parents) that self-bond or utilize a parent company 
guarantee. First, there is the cost saving associated with 
the fact that these measures, unlike a bond or guarantee 
purchased from a third party, come at no direct cost to 
the operator or its parent.167 They merely need to pass a 
financial test.
Second, there is the further, more socially and environ-
mentally harmful saving deriving from the fact that the 
measures provide the “space” for obligations to be dis-
claimed in bankruptcy. As they do not require assets or 
funds to be ring-fenced to finance the future works, they 
are notoriously fragile in the event of the bankruptcy of the 
operator or its parent company.168 Their perceived efficacy 
rests on the somewhat tenuous assumption that satisfaction 
of certain financial tests or ratios render the operator (or 
an affiliate, such as a parent or subsidiary) able to meet the 
costs of their future environmental obligations.169
Self-bonding may work when a sector is “boom-
ing and resilient.”170 However, it backfires if prices fall, 
demand wanes, and the sector’s resilience deteriorates.171 
If the operator (or their parent) enters into bankruptcy 
proceedings, their assets will generally be available to its 
creditors.172 The prospect of the regulator, positioned as 
an unsecured creditor, receiving anything, let alone a sum 
close to what is needed to complete the works, is often 
extremely low.173 For example, in the U.S. coal sector, the 
world’s largest coal company, Peabody Energy, entered 
into bankruptcy in April 2016 with recognized reclama-
tion obligations of approximately $2 billion, with only 
$600 million covered by surety bonds and other guaran-
tees.174 The remainder ($1.43 billion) were self-bonded.175 
As a result, it was able to discharge around $745 million 
of its liabilities in bankruptcy,176 with “state regulators 
167. Mackie & Fogleman, supra note 20, at 305.
168. Id. at 296.
169. Id. at 308.
170. Jeanna Heard, Bankruptcy’s Role in the Growing Dilemma of Self-Bonding in 
the Coal Industry, 34 Emory Bankr. Dev. J. 205, 211 (2017).
171. Id. at 238.
172. The position in Canada is now different following the 2019 decision of the 
Canadian Supreme Court in Orphan Well Association v. Grant Thornton Ltd., 
[2019] S.C.C. 5 [hereinafter Redwater]. There, it was held that an operator’s 
entry into bankruptcy proceedings did not necessarily negate the onus upon 
the operator or, more accurately, the insolvency professional dealing with 
the insolvent operator’s estate, to undertake their end-of-life obligations. In 
Redwater, S.C.C., para. 160 (emphasis added), Chief Justice Richard Wag-
ner held:
Bankruptcy is not a licence to ignore rules, and insolvency profes-
sionals are bound by and must comply with valid provincial laws 
during bankruptcy. They must, for example, comply with non-mon-
etary obligations that are binding on the bankrupt estate, that cannot 
be reduced to provable claims, and the effects of which do not conflict 
with the [Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act], notwithstanding the con-
sequences this may have for the bankrupt’s secured creditors.
In Redwater, the insolvency professional was required to comply with the 
operator’s unfulfilled end-of-life obligations.
173. Malone & Winslow, supra note 14, at 4.
174. Macey & Salovaara, supra note 18, at 928.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 933.
[accepting] a mere 17 cents on the dollar” with respect to 
the self-bonded obligations.177
Described as “uniquely susceptible to complete 
failure,”178 the scale at which self-bonding has been 
accepted in some sectors is deeply troubling. For instance, 
in 2015, GAO found that $33 billion of decommission-
ing liabilities associated with oil and gas infrastructure in 
the Gulf of Mexico were self-bonded.179 This equated to 
86.4% of the total estimated liabilities in the Gulf.180 And, 
collectively, the four largest coal companies in the United 
States had accumulated nearly $2.8 billion in self-bonded 
reclamation obligations by 2015.181
C. The Competitive Advantage
Where a jurisdiction’s FARs are absent or inefficacious in 
form, then this may confer a competitive advantage upon 
operators trading from it.182 Other things being equal, 
operators there will, due to their lower costs of compliance, 
be advantaged when competing against operators trading 
from more stringent regimes.183 The competitive advantage 
may be generated in two distinct ways.
First, the practices identified above in Section II.B 
not only reduce an operator’s cost of compliance—and 
so save them money—but also allow them to use those 
funds more productively than operators in regimes with 
stringent FARs. To draw upon an example that illustrates 
the point starkly: while licensees of nuclear reactors in 
the United States can utilize the highly attractive parent 
company guarantee to satisfy NRC’s FARs,184 those in 
Canada are prohibited from doing so under the Canadian 
Nuclear Safety Commission’s FARs.185 And Jeanna Heard 
observes that self-bonding enabled U.S. coal companies to 
“thrive and stay competitive in the global market,” by per-
mitting them to continue to use funds that would other-
wise have been set aside for reclamation bonds.186 Billions 
of dollars were released and made available to reinvest 
and grow.187 However, the sector’s profitability has largely 
evaporated and the funds needed to undertake the works 
no longer exist.
Second, and relatedly, where an operator ceases to trade 
prior to performing their end-of-life obligations in full, 
then, in the absence of (efficacious) financial assurance, it 
has been permitted to place on the market (1) energy or 
(2) the raw sources of energy that have been extracted, 
without bearing the true social cost of its production. The 
177. Id. at 929.
178. Malone & Winslow, supra note 14, at 4.
179. GAO, GAO-16-40, Offshore Oil and Gas Resources: Actions Need-
ed to Better Protect Against Billions of Dollars in Federal Ex-
posure to Decommissioning Liabilities 24-25 (2015), https://www.gao.
gov/assets/680/674353.pdf.
180. As of October 2015, total decommissioning liabilities in the Gulf were esti-
mated at $38.2 billion. Id. at 24.
181. Macey & Salovaara, supra note 18, at 895.
182. Arnold, supra note 32, at 282; Stewart, supra note 23, at 2057; Komoroski, 
supra note 23, at 204.
183. Stewart, supra note 23, at 2044. The reverse will also be true. Id. at 2056.
184. 10 C.F.R. §50.75(e)(1)(iii)(B) (2020).
185. CNSC, Regdoc-3.3.1, supra note 12, at sec. 4.7.
186. Heard, supra note 170, at 211.
187. Id.
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pertinent framework has allowed the operator to external-
ize some (or, potentially, all) of the costs associated with its 
end-of-life obligations, creating false price signals for con-
sumers and sending entirely the wrong messages to indus-
try.188 The costs of undertaking those obligations should, 
from an efficiency perspective, have been internalized by 
the operator.189 A competitive advantage is conferred upon 
that operator over those operators who have internalized 
their costs.190 As consumers benefit from market prices 
that do not reflect the true social cost of the energy proj-
ect, there is greater demand for energy produced by, or raw 
sources of energy (e.g., coal, oil and gas) extracted by, the 
operators whose activities have been subsidized indirect-
ly.191 Therefore, more of that form of energy is produced, or 
raw source extracted, than is socially efficient.192
The effect of these two points can be illustrated with 
a simple example. This assumes that the initial estimate 
of the costs of the end-of-life obligations was accurate. A 
regime that creates conditions for a large “assurance defi-
cit”—which we define as the difference between the esti-
mated costs of undertaking the requisite works and the 
level of assurance actually held by the regulator—is imple-
mented in one state (State A). There, self-bonding and 
parent company guarantees are permitted, and for those 
operators that choose to make a cash deposit, funds can 
accumulate across the project’s operational life. In contrast, 
a regime that presents little or no assurance deficit is imple-
mented in two other states (States B and C). There, cash 
deposits reflecting the full estimated costs of the works 
must be placed in a segregated bank account in favor of the 
regulator prior to works commencing.
The disparity in regimes distorts competition and 
affects trade between the states. The position of operators 
in State A is strengthened as compared to competing oper-
ators in States B and C. Operators in State A that self-bond 
or who benefit from a parent company guarantee do not 
have to bear the costs of providing assurance. And through 
those measures, they (or their parent companies) possess 
the “space” to disclaim obligations through bankruptcy. 
This has the potential to reduce the price of the energy 
produced, or raw sources of energy extracted, in State A 
and exported to States B and C. If operators in State A 
had been required to make efficacious financial assurance 
(as is required from operators in States B and C), then the 
costs associated with undertaking their obligations would 
have been borne as a cost of production (i.e., “internalized” 
188. Mackie & Combe, supra note 25, at 102.
189. Rudy Perkins, Electricity Deregulation, Environmental Externalities, and 
the Limitations of Price, 39 B.C. L. Rev. 993, 1033 (1998) (internal 
citations omitted).
190. David A. Wirth, The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development: 
Two Steps Forward and One Back, or Vice Versa?, 29 Ga. L. Rev. 599, 643-
44 (1995) (“a country of export’s failure to implement the Polluter Pays 
Principle could be treated as a pollution subsidy that distorts internation-
al trade”); Dernbach, supra note 147, at 59 (“externalized costs provide 
an indirect subsidy that may give the benefited entity an international 
trade advantage”).
191. Nicolas de Sadeleer, Environmental Principles: From Political Slo-
gans to Legal Rules 21 (2002).
192. Genevra Richardson et al., Policing Pollution: A Study of Regula-
tion and Enforcement 4 (1982); Anthony I. Ogus, Regulation: Le-
gal Form and Economic Theory 19, 35 (2004).
by them). When internalized costs are not reflected in an 
increased energy or raw material price, operators must tol-
erate reduced profitability.193
Conversely, the energy produced, or the raw energy 
sources extracted, in States B and C, whose operators 
have borne the costs associated with their obligations, are 
less competitive in State A as there is a cheaper alterna-
tive. Thus, the stringent FARs in States B and C—which 
exhibit a low assurance deficit—have a detrimental effect 
on the international competitiveness of operators from 
those states. The reverse is also true. While the general pub-
lic may benefit from cheaper energy prices as a result of lax 
FARs, the effect of these indirect (or, according to Simms, 
“furtive”) subsidies is “to compel communities to pay part 
of the cost of . . . [the operator’s] . . . profit-making activity 
. . . whether or not the affected members of the public con-
sent or themselves realize any substantial benefit.”194 The 
environment also bears the burden.
Thus, an operator’s costs of production, of which end-of-
life obligations are a significant component, may be altered 
dramatically by the stringency of a jurisdiction’s FARs (or 
lack thereof), including the approaches that are permitted 
in order to satisfy them. This may impact upon the attrac-
tiveness of a jurisdiction as a business location. The degree 
of subsidization may be a pull factor when subsidization is 
high and a push factor when the degree of subsidization is 
low. For instance, as we have seen, self-bonding and parent 
company (corporate) guarantees release funds to be used 
productively by operators. This means that jurisdictions 
that tolerate these measures have a distinct advantage in 
attracting operators over states that do not.195 Jurisdictions, 
therefore, have incentives to rely on inefficacious FARs as 
a tool to make their domestic operators more competitive.
To build upon the above example, operators from States 
B and C, where FARs are stringent, may move their opera-
tions to State A to take advantage of its less stringent FARs. 
Or States B and C may relax their regimes to stem such a 
flow. While the jurisdiction will weigh other factors into 
the equation, such as the benefits attained through effec-
tive environmental protection measures, it is conceivable 
that it could lead to a “race to the bottom,” with them loos-
ening their FARs in order to gain a competitive advantage 
in the sector.196 This may produce short-term gains but is 
clearly bad for the environment, human health, and public 
funds in the long term. The downside is that states, such 
as State A, are also unlikely to give up their competitive 
position voluntarily by strengthening their FARs if there is 
a risk that others will not.197
State A’s FARs may also encourage overproduction and 
overconsumption of environmentally harmful forms of 
energy, enriching operators trading from it at the expense 
193. Charles Pearson, Testing the System: GATT + PPP = ?, 27 Cornell Int’l 
L.J. 553, 555-56 (1994); Boyd, Financial Responsibility, supra note 11, 
at 29.
194. Simms, supra note 140, at 434, 444.
195. Heard, supra note 170, at 217 (emphasis added).
196. Stewart, supra note 23, at 2058-59.
197. Id. at 2045 (“Nations that have adopted less stringent standards presumably 
wish to retain whatever economic benefits, including competitive advan-
tages, that such standards confers.”).
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of its taxpayers.198 Where operators are not required (or 
know that they will not be so required) to bear the full 
costs associated with their end-of-life obligations, they are 
incentivized to carry out the activity to the point at which 
no further private gain can be obtained (i.e., overutilize it), 
intensifying the damage and deterioration caused.199 This 
concern is particularly pertinent to the fossil fuel sector 
where operators maximize extraction knowing that they 
will be unable to meet their end-of-life obligations. In the 
context of the U.S. surface mining coal industry, Joshua 
Macey and Jackson Salovaara assert that when a company 
finds itself in financial troubles “it has an incentive to con-
tinue to expand as rapidly as possible, because the larger its 
unclaimed environmental obligations, the more desperate 
state regulators will be to find a way for the company to 
stay in business.”200 This is likely to force further indirect 
subsidization of the sector.
III. The Polluter-Pays Question
This part examines whether the function of FARs ought 
to be to allocate to operators the costs associated with 
their end-of-life obligations and require their internaliza-
tion. The allocation of pollution prevention and control 
costs to polluters was the primary policy goal that led to 
the origination and subsequent development of a polluter-
pays principle by the OECD, an intergovernmental eco-
nomic organization with 36 Member countries.201 The 
United States, Canada, and the U.K. are Member coun-
tries. The OECD’s economic goal gained traction in the 
environmental laws of jurisdictions across the world, often 
evolving into a recognized legal norm within their unique 
legal systems. Under EU environmental law, for instance, 
the polluter-pays principle is described as a “cost allocation 
principle.”202 This leads us to consider whether this idea 
should shape our account. There are, of course, other ana-
lytical frames. The idea of “stewardship” is valuable and 
relevant.203 However, the economic goals of a “polluter 
pays” mindset have dominated debates on environmental 
liability for some time and so merit exploration.
It is important to observe from the outset that similarly 
named principles do not “indicate equivalent legal devel-
opments across jurisdictions.”204 Thus, the precise manner 
in which a “polluter pays”-styled principle is understood 
and implemented in one jurisdiction may differ to how it 
is in another. We resolve the methodical impropriety asso-
198. Kim, supra note 42, at 125.
199. John Alder & David Wilkinson, Environmental Law and Ethics 172 
(1999).
200. Macey & Salovaara, supra note 18, at 898 (emphasis added).
201. For a full list of members see OECD, List of OECD Member Countries—
Ratification of the Convention on the OECD, https://www.oecd.org/about/
document/list-oecd-member-countries.htm (last visited May 4, 2020).
202. Case C-254/08, Futura Immobiliare Srl Hotel Futura v. Comune di Caso-
ria, 3 C.M.L.R. 45, para. 33 (2009) (opinion of Advocate General Kokott).
203. Emma Lees, The Polluter Pays Principle and the Remediation of the Land, 8 
Int’l J.L. Built Env’t 2, 3 (2016); Emma Lees, Interpreting the Contami-
nated Land Regime: Should the “Polluter” Pay?, 14 Envtl. L. Rev. 98, 107 
(2012).
204. Eloise Scotford, Environmental Principles and the Evolution of 
Environmental Law 4 (2017).
ciated with examining the polluter-pays principle—when 
there is, strictly, no such singular conception—by focusing 
our analysis upon the OECD’s vision for it. This should be 
viewed as a supranational position of economic policy.
Admittedly, examination of that particular concep-
tion is localized and specific to the culture and unique 
aims of that organization.205 However, its theoretical basis 
is sophisticated, illuminating of the regulatory potential 
attributable to cost allocation as a normative goal, and it 
is accepted by the United States, Canada, and the U.K. 
as OECD Member countries. Further, that conception of 
the principle was introduced by the OECD in an attempt 
to combat the types of issues that were shown to arise due 
to absent or inefficacious FARs: state subsidization of 
environmental protection measures and the consequen-
tial potential for distortions in trade and investment. For 
these reasons, it offers a relevant, scalable version of the 
principle whose scope and policy rationales are clear and 
highly pertinent to our analysis. It also offers an original 
lens through which to explore the function of FARs for 
end-of-life obligations in the energy sector. The literature 
that does examine this does not, typically, refer to the prin-
ciple’s trade-related policy rationale.
A. The OECD’s Conception of the 
Polluter-Pays Principle
The OECD first introduced guiding principles in 1972 to 
deal with the international economic and trade implica-
tions of environmental policies, a polluter-pays principle 
being one.206 For the OECD, this principle meant that the 
polluter should bear the expenses of carrying out pollution 
prevention and control measures decided by public author-
ities to ensure the environment was in an “acceptable” 
state.207 The costs of these measures were to be “reflected in 
the cost” of goods and services that cause pollution in pro-
duction and/or consumption (i.e., internalized).208 More-
over, the measures were not to be accompanied by subsidies 
that would create “significant” distortions in international 
trade and investment.209 This message was echoed in a clar-
ification of the principle in 1974,210 with guidance given 
there on certain exceptions to the principle. An important 
extension to the principle was made by the OECD in 1989 
when it asserted that operators of hazardous installations 
should bear the cost of reasonable measures to prevent and 
control accidental pollution from their installations.211
This allocation of prevention and control costs to the 
polluter had two aims. These have become the “enduring 
205. OECD 1972 Recommendation, supra note 27, para. 2.
206. Id.
207. Id. para. 4.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. OECD, C(74)132, Recommendation of the Council on the Implementa-
tion of the Polluter-Pays Principle (1974).
211. OECD, C(89)88, Recommendation of the Council Concerning the Appli-
cation of the Polluter-Pays Principle to Accidental Pollution, para. 4 (1989).
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purposes” of the polluter-pays principle.212 The first was to 
encourage (more) rational use of environmental resourc-
es.213 The OECD recognized that if the costs of dete-
rioration to environmental resources caused by economic 
activity were not incorporated into the “price system,” then 
the market would not account for the scarcity of those 
resources.214 However, if regulatory measures could ensure 
that the prices of goods reflected their scarcity “more 
closely,” then a more efficient allocation of resources would 
be achieved and pollution reduced.215
The second aim was to avoid distortion of international 
trade and investment.216 This was an important “political” 
objective.217 When industrialized nations sought to rem-
edy their environmental problems in the late 1960s, there 
was the realization that new costs would be imposed upon 
manufacturers from states adopting strong environmen-
tal protection positions.218 There was a concern that some 
states would use public funds to subsidize private pollution 
control, thereby granting their domestic companies a com-
petitive edge by conferring a price advantage upon them 
in the market.219 This would cause imbalances in interna-
tional trade.220 We witnessed a similar potential in relation 
to a state’s FARs in Section II.C.
Two points must be clarified before we proceed. First, 
end-of-life obligations would not appear to be a cost that 
the OECD intended to encompass in its original concep-
tion of the principle. The works attached to such obliga-
tions are inherently restorative.221 They are different in 
nature to the preventive and purely remedial works fol-
lowing a pollution incident to which the OECD referred. 
That said, the allocation of the costs of complying with 
future, known environmental obligations (i.e., end-of-life 
obligations) to operators can deliver the economic goals 
which the OECD sought to achieve through its origina-
tion of the principle. These, as we have seen, comprised 
the desire to encourage more rational use of environmental 
resources and avoid distortions in international trade and 
investment. We therefore contend that end-of-life obliga-
tions are a cost that can rightly come within the purview 
of the principle.
Second, the OECD provided no guidance on the type 
of instruments that were to be used to implement their 
principle within the legal frameworks of its Member coun-
tries.222 By “implement” the principle, we mean codify the 
policy position that an operator ought to reflect certain 
costs in its costs of production to achieve the two objec-
212. Sanford E. Gaines, The Polluter-Pays Principle: From Economic Equity to En-
vironmental Ethos, 26 Tex. Int’l L.J. 463, 489 (1991).




217. Hans C. Bugge, The Polluter Pays Principle: Dilemmas of Justice in National 
and International Contexts, in Environmental Law and Justice in Con-
text 411, 414 (Jonas Ebbesson & Phoebe Okowa eds., Cambridge Univ. 
Press 2009).
218. Gaines, supra note 212, at 466.
219. Id. at 465-66, 471.
220. Id. at 465.
221. See Section IV.B.1 for further discussion.
222. OECD 1972 Recommendation, supra note 27, Annex 1.
tives detailed above. Routes to implementation were left 
entirely to the legislatures of Member countries. In theory, 
FARs provide a potentially powerful regulatory instru-
ment, alongside taxes, charges, and a liability system, 
capable of implementing the OECD’s policy position.223 
The reality as to whether this can be achieved will, as we 
shall now see, depend upon the particular financial assur-
ance measure(s) under scrutiny and the time frame over 
which funds are permitted to accumulate during the proj-
ect’s operational life.
B. Cost Allocation as the Function of FARs
We now reflect on whether the economic focus of the 
OECD’s principle ought to inform our account of the func-
tion of FARs. We are interested in whether FARs, the spec-
ificities of which would be shaped by the normative goal of 
allocating the costs associated with end-of-life obligations 
to operators, could achieve two important regulatory goals: 
first, the policy objectives described in the previous section; 
second, that the requisite works are performed at the opera-
tor’s own private cost.
It should be noted that the OECD was concerned with 
cost allocation (i.e., who should pay) when it originated the 
principle.224 However, realization of the goals identified in 
the previous section, specifically engendering more ratio-
nal and sustainable purchasing patterns by consumers and 
avoiding distortions in international trade and investment, 
is contingent upon not only the costs being allocated to 
polluters, but polluters actually reflecting them in the cost 
of producing their goods or providing their services. This 
is commonly known as cost internalization, but the OECD 
did not utilize that language when it originated the prin-
ciple. Technically, costs could be allocated notionally to 
a polluter under a legal framework, but that polluter may 
not internalize them unless they are required to or suffi-
ciently incentivized to. We proceed on the basis that the 
OECD intended that cost allocation was a natural precur-
sor to cost internalization and that this understanding was 
implicit in its use of the term “allocate” and its variants 
(i.e., the OECD intended that the allocated costs be inter-
nalized by polluters). We can therefore see a clear role for 
FARs, as one category of instrument for implementation of 
the OECD’s policy position, to facilitate this.
The cost-internalizing potential of FARs for end-of-life 
obligations has been recognized in pockets of the litera-
ture. However, as we shall see, this is often a side issue to 
the main thrust of the work. A clear and explicit connec-
tion between FARs for such obligations and furtherance 
of the policy objectives examined above has, however, not 
been made. Indeed, in four significant contributions to the 
theory and understanding of FARs for reclamation and 
223. Maria Lee, Tort, Regulation, and Environmental Liability, 21 Legal 
Stud. 1 33, 38 (2002) (“The polluter pays principle . . . can be imple-
mented by a variety of regulatory techniques. It does not necessitate even 
a liability system.”).
224. Candice Stevens, Interpreting the Polluter Pays Principle in the Trade and En-
vironment Context, 27 Cornell Int’l L.J. 577, 579 (1994).
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restoration works,225 there is no mention of a polluter-pays 
principle in the main body of the work.226 This is surpris-
ing given, as we have seen, that the trade-distorting effects 
of absent or inefficacious FARs are particularly acute, 
albeit hidden.
In the literature that has considered the cost inter-
nalization function of FARs for end-of-life obligations, 
Macey and Salovaara observe that the U.S. Surface Min-
ing Control and Reclamation Act’s bonding requirements 
serve two purposes: “[t]hey ensure that the land will be 
reclaimed, and they force coal companies to internalize 
the environmental costs associated with mining.”227 Two 
comments may be made here. First as a preliminary point, 
the statement is more reflective of the ideology of the Act’s 
bonding requirements than the reality of their implemen-
tation. Indeed, the authors identify some quite significant 
regulatory problems with them, specifically the Act’s toler-
ability of self-bonding, the scale of its acceptance, and the 
risks that go with it.228 Second, while the authors make 
the important observation that reclamation and cost inter-
nalization are two distinct purposes of FARs, they do not 
elaborate upon the relationship between them. While rec-
lamation (at the operator’s private cost) does lead inevitably 
to cost internalization, cost internalization does not lead 
inevitably to reclamation.
As we shall see shortly, there is significant conceptual 
uncertainty surrounding what cost internalization means 
from a legal perspective and what it requires from operators 
in practical terms. It suffices to note here that an operator 
may internalize their obligations in different ways, includ-
ing by self-bonding, reserving cash in accounts, or pur-
chasing a bond from a third party. However, each of these 
measures has the potential to fail entirely, meaning that 
the private funds required to undertake the works may not 
be available when needed. Thus, while cost internalization 
may have technically occurred when the bond was posted, 
it cannot ensure that the end-of-life obligations will be per-
formed at the operator’s private cost.
James Boyd and Daniel Ingberman recognized that 
something more than bare cost internalization is needed, 
identifying that FARs “foster cost internalization by man-
dating the existence of capital reserves dedicated to the satisfac-
tion of liabilities, even after corporate dissolution.”229 Two 
225. See Boyd, Financial Assurance Rules, supra note 31; Boyd, Financial 
Responsibility, supra note 11; Macey & Salovaara, supra note 18; David 
Gerard, The Law and Economics of Reclamation Bonds, 2 Resources Pol’y 
189, 189 (2000).
226. The exception is, perhaps, Malone and Winslow who contend that “[t]he 
underlying principle for financial assurance in environmental law is that the 
polluter pays for their environmental costs.” Malone & Winslow, supra note 
14, at 5. They do not, however, seek to tie that statement to any specific con-
ception of the principle. As we know, there is no singular conception of it. 
Moreover, the authors proceed to assert that “[t]his Article does not question 
the polluter-pays concept, but rather, seeks to evaluate the environmental 
laws designed to assure such cost internalization.” Id. (emphasis added). We 
take a more critical perspective on the principle, probing the validity of 
its normative function in the context of end-of-life obligations. Moreover, 
Malone and Winslow do not seek to link their assertion to the anti-trade-
distorting effect of cost internalization, which is the focus of this Article.
227. Macey & Salovaara, supra note 18, at 894 (emphasis added).
228. Id. at 897.
229. James Boyd & Daniel Ingberman, The Vertical Extension of Environmental 
Liability Through Chains of Ownership in Contract and Supply, in The Law 
observations may be made here. First, the authors appeared 
to view cost internalization as the secondary (or indirect) 
goal of creating dedicated capital reserves, an idea that we 
develop in Part V. Cost internalization was something to 
be encouraged. Capital reserves were to be created, prin-
cipally, to ensure operators satisfied their liabilities. This 
would occur when the operator performed the works or 
where the regulator used the assurance to perform them 
on the operator’s behalf. The satisfaction of liabilities—or, 
more accurately, the performance of the requisite works—
was their primary goal. An indirect effect of this would 
be that the costs of doing so would be internalized by the 
operator. We see strength in this position.
Second, not all financial assurance measures mandate 
the creation of a capital reserve. Escrow accounts, sinking 
funds, trust funds, and cash deposits in favor of the regu-
lator are examples of measures that do so. Self-bonding 
and parent company guarantee do not mandate a capital 
reserve, meaning that the ability of the operator to satisfy 
their liabilities is low if the operator becomes bankrupt.230 
Measures such as surety bonds and bank guarantees pose 
a similar risk because they also do not mandate that such 
a reserve exists.
These measures, which are provided by a third party, 
exhibit potential to fail for different reasons. Surety bonds 
and bank guarantees, when distilled down to their basic 
function, are built upon the financial strength of the 
third-party providers. Banks and insurers, like other orga-
nizations, can and do become bankrupt.231 They are not 
immune from the risk of financial deterioration. Even where 
the financial position of the third-party provider remains 
strong, it may dispute its liability under the instrument, 
meaning the obligations may not be paid for by them.232 
The lack of a capital reserve inhibits the measure’s ability to 
satisfy the operator’s liabilities. We return to this in Part V.
In a separate contribution, Boyd briefly explored “con-
ceptual justifications” for FARs.233 He does, however, 
caveat that discussion with the assertion that “[t]he report 
will primarily deal with financial assurance as a comple-
ment to pollution liability law.”234 That is, his interest in 
FARs for end-of-life obligations was indirect and second-
ary to his focus on liabilities arising from, for example, 
industrial accidents. In a short section titled “Financial 
Assurance as a Performance Bond,” he makes the interest-
ing and insightful observation that assurance instruments 
for end-of-life obligations “are best thought of as surety, 
or performance, bonds to guarantee the performance of a 
known future action.”235
and Economics of the Environment 44, 65 (Anthony Heyes ed., Ed-
ward Elgar Publishing 2001) (emphasis added).
230. Malone & Winslow, supra note 14, at 4. While Malone and Winslow are 
referring explicitly to self-bonds, the same concerns are pertinent to parent 
company guarantees.
231. See Boyd, Financial Responsibility, supra note 11, at 39-41, for perti-
nent examples of assurance provider insolvencies.
232. Mackie & Fogleman, supra note 20, at 330-31.
233. Boyd, Financial Assurance Rules, supra note 31, at 3.
234. Id. n.7.
235. Id. at 5 (emphasis added). Shortly afterwards, he repeats that “bond-based 
assurance,” of the type that would be utilized for end-of-life obligations, 
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On the face of it, this appears to speak to the importance 
of, and focus upon, securing performance of that action, 
something that we develop in Part IV. However, it seems 
to have been offered from a purely cost internalization per-
spective. For Boyd, the “motivation” for assurance for end-
of-life obligations is that the instrument “guarantees that 
operator funds will be available in the future to internalize 
costs associated with their commercial operations.”236 And 
in another contribution, he asserts that “[a]ssurance rules 
need to guarantee firms’ ability to internalize the costs of 
future environmental obligations.”237 Through this lens, the 
dominant function of FARs is to facilitate cost internaliza-
tion, not engender performance of the works as a venerable 
goal in itself. While Macey and Salovaara deemed FARs 
to possess two distinct purposes, specifically guaranteeing 
both performance and cost internalization, Boyd appeared 
to view cost internalization as guaranteeing performance. 
We highlight problems with this position below.
Boyd emphasizes the wider benefits of securing cost 
internalization via FARs. He asserts that the “very point” 
of assurance is to “raise” the operator’s costs by “ forcing 
the internalization of otherwise avoided obligations.”238 
These are redistributed costs, not new ones. In the absence 
of FARs or in the presence of inefficacious FARs, society 
and the environment itself are, typically, left to bear these 
costs should the operator become bankrupt.239 According 
to Boyd, “[a]ssurance simply redistributes those costs to 
the polluter.”240 Indeed, this was the aim of the OECD’s 
origination of the polluter-pays principle. The newly inter-
nalized costs are “very real” to the operator and can be 
expected to reduce its profitability.241
It is in this way that efficacious FARs can generate more 
informed decisionmaking at an early stage in the project-
planning process. The costs associated with end-of-life 
obligations would be factored into business planning as a 
cost of production, making certain energy projects, such as 
opening a new coal mine, less appealing from the operator’s 
perspective. Other projects will become more appealing. 
Thus, efficacious FARs, viewed as a type of legal interven-
tion, may help market forces steer transition to cleaner, less 
environmentally damaging forms of energy. There is also 
the ensuing incentive for operators to develop legitimate 
means of undertaking their obligations at lower cost, such 
as through careful selection of the site itself and intelligent 
design of the installation, including ease of its decommis-
sioning. This will reduce the level of funds to be dedicated 
to end-of-life obligations.
However, when we apply the logic of cost internaliza-
tion to FARs for end-of-life obligations, some important 
limitations inherent in the OECD’s economic conception 
of the principle emerge. Indeed, these limitations may be 
seen in other conceptions of the principle, such as those 
“guarantees performance of a known regulatory restoration, or other perfor-
mance, requirement.” Id. (emphasis added).
236. Id. (emphasis added).
237. Boyd, Financial Responsibility, supra note 11, at 37.
238. Id. at 29.
239. Id.
240. Id. (emphasis added).
241. Id.
implemented within discrete legal systems, that prioritize 
the economic goal of cost internalization over other nor-
mative goals.242 First, while polluter cost internalization 
has been viewed as “nearly unassailable as a guiding prin-
ciple for environmental regulation,”243 it is a legally impre-
cise regulatory function for FARs. Claiming baldly that 
costs ought to be internalized is akin to asserting that pol-
luters ought to pay. And the latter is first and foremost a 
statement of policy, and a somewhat vague one at that.244 
As with the polluter-pays principle, it is the manner in 
which the requirement to internalize costs is codified and 
implemented within legislation and elucidated in guidance 
issued by the regulator that gives shape, structure, and 
meaning to it as a legal rule.245 It possesses limited norma-
tive value in the absence of this.
Nevertheless, some large conceptual issues hinder the 
ability for the economic idea of cost internalization to oper-
ate as the regulatory function of FARs. These derive from 
the uncertainty surrounding what internalization means 
for, and requires from, operators in strict legal terms. 
Anthony Ogus captures the feeling in the literature when 
he asserts that internalization is concerned principally with 
requiring an operator to “cover” the costs that could poten-
tially be imposed on others in the “pricing” of its goods or 
services.246 Such costs could, of course, encompass end-of-
life obligations.
Importantly, a wide array of terminology has been used 
to describe the action of “internalization,” with scholars 
referring to the idea of costs being included in the polluter’s 
financial balance sheets247; brought within the polluter’s 
accounts248; taken into account in the polluter’s decision-
making process249; absorbed by the causer250; accounted for 
in the cost of the transaction251; accounted for in a proj-
242. While, with the exception of the Water Environment (Water Framework 
Directive) (England and Wales) Regulations 2017/407, the polluter-pays 
principle is not mentioned explicitly in legislation pertaining to environ-
mental liability in England and Wales, there are a handful of explicit refer-
ences to it in the statutory guidance associated with the contaminated land 
regime in Part IIA of the Environmental Protection Act 1990. There, it is 
tentatively defined as the principle by virtue of which “the costs of remedi-
ating pollution are to be borne by the polluter,” providing a clear nod to a 
cost internalizing role. Department for Environment, Food, and Ru-
ral Affairs, Environmental Protection Act of 1990: Part 2A—Con-
taminated Land Statutory Guidance 63 (2012), https://assets.publish-
ing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/223705/pb13735cont-land-guidance.pdf.
243. Boyd, Financial Responsibility, supra note 11, at 2.
244. Scotford, supra note 204, at 3.
245. Lee, supra note 223, at 39 (“It is only in the detailed design of a regulatory 
scheme that the polluter pays principle begins to acquire any meaning.”).
246. Ogus, supra note 192, at 19.
247. In accounting, the term “internalization” is “the process of including in fi-
nancial balance sheets the cost factors which were previously either not cal-
culated (for example the cost of environmental damage) or met by society at 
large (for example the health costs associated with pollution).” Chris Park 
& Michael Allaby, A Dictionary of Environment and Conservation 
(3d ed. 2017).
248. For Sanford Gaines, the “classic model” of cost internalization meant that 
“[t]he producer’s investment in pollution control brings within its own ac-
counts the cost of the pollution it had previously inflicted without charge on 
external parties.” Gaines, supra note 212, at 469.
249. Michael Faure, Economic Aspects of Environmental Liability: An Introduction, 
4 Eur. Rev. Private L. 85 (1996).
250. Alder & Wilkinson, supra note 199, at 30.
251. Perkins, supra note 189, at 994 n.4.
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ect’s projected costs252; and reflected in the market price of 
the operator’s goods.253 And in a 1992 report, the OECD 
indicated that internalization meant that the costs had 
been “charged” to the polluter.254 While the language uti-
lized differs in each of these accounts, they chime with the 
original logic of the OECD: internalization means reflect-
ing pollution prevention and control costs in the operator’s 
costs of production.
However, as we saw above, to assert that the costs asso-
ciated with end-of-life obligations ought to be internalized 
by operators says nothing as to the ability of that course of 
action to facilitate performance of those obligations. These 
are two entirely different goals. Indeed, we may say that, as 
an economic idea, cost internalization is ambivalent as to 
whether performance does, in fact, occur. Two arguments 
support this assertion.
The first is that the economic idea is unable to offer any 
normative steer as to the broad types of financial assur-
ance measures that operators ought to use to facilitate its 
goal. The proper selection of these is crucial to successful 
performance of end-of-life obligations. Cost internaliza-
tion merely requires that certain costs be “reflected” in the 
operator’s costs of production or “covered” in the pricing 
of the goods. It does not tell us how or when this ought 
to be done. In fact, an economist may be content that cost 
internalization has occurred upon provision for the costs of 
undertaking the works being made in the operator’s bal-
ance sheet.255 This does describe one particular character-
ization of cost internalization, albeit one that would appear 
to sit comfortably with the descriptions of cost internal-
ization detailed above (e.g., brought within the polluter’s 
accounts; taken into account in the polluter’s decisionmak-
ing process; absorbed by the causer; etc.).
However, as a means of evidencing assurance, provi-
sion in accounts is often explicitly prohibited in guidance 
produced by regulators due to the lack of security that it 
accords to the regulator in the event of the operator’s finan-
cial deterioration.256 And when should cost internalization 
occur? Ought this to be prior to operations commencing, 
during the operational phase of the project, or upon closure 
252. Richard D. Gary & Michael L. Teague, The Inclusion of Externalities in Elec-
tric Generation Resource Planning: Coal in the Crossfire, 95 W. Va. L. Rev. 
839, 842 (1993).
253. Lucas Bergkamp, Liability and Environment: Private and Public Law 
Aspects of Civil Liability for Environmental Harm in an Interna-
tional Context 74 (2001).
254. For the OECD, “[i]n the economic theory, internalisation means that a 
cost which otherwise would be borne by an economic agent other than the 
polluter . . . is charged to the polluter who as a result ‘internalises’ such cost 
with all the other costs he already bears.” OECD, OCDE/GD(92)81, The 
Polluter-Pays Principle: OECD Analyses and Recommendations 5 (1992), 
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=
OCDE/GD(92)81&docLanguage=En.
255. Park & Allaby, supra note 247.
256. In relation to the decommissioning of OREIs under the U.K.’s Energy Act 
2004, BEIS asserts:
If a developer/owner simply intends to reserve cash in its own ac-
counts, even if it is separated from the company’s operating ac-
counts, then it will not be considered an acceptable approach as the 
Secretary of State would not be guaranteed access to the money in 
the event of a default.
BEIS, Decommissioning of Offshore Renewable Energy Installa-
tions, supra note 121, at 35.
of the site? The economic idea of cost internalization pro-
vides no answers to these important questions.
The second argument relates to the fact that even where 
costs have been internalized by the operator, it does not 
mean that the funds necessary to complete the works actu-
ally exist or, where they do exist, are protected from the 
claims of its creditors should it enter into bankruptcy pro-
ceedings. This post-internalization issue has not been rec-
ognized in the literature, yet that protection is essential if 
the regulator is to ensure that the works can actually be 
performed by the operator or, in the operator’s default, by 
the regulator utilizing the assurance that is available. Thus, 
bare cost internalization, in the sense that the operator 
is merely required to “cover” or “reflect” the costs of the 
works in the pricing of its goods or services,257 is an entirely 
inadequate regulatory goal if performance of an operator’s 
obligations is the priority. If performance is to be guaran-
teed, it necessitates segregation of the entire funds neces-
sary to complete the works from the general body of the 
operator’s or third-party provider’s assets and them being 
rendered available as and when needed. We term this “pro-
ductive” cost internalization.
Where “productive” cost internalization does not occur, 
the cost may be allocated to the polluter, internalized by 
them but, owing to the effect of bankruptcy law drawing 
all available assets into the pool accessible by creditors, it 
may not actually be able to fulfill its end-of-life obligations 
due to a lack of funds. In such circumstances, the costs 
may, at least to a certain extent, be reflected in the opera-
tor’s cost of production and, therefore, technically inter-
nalized. However, the internalization is “unproductive” for 
the purposes of guaranteeing the performance of the obli-
gations. Thus, while the policy objectives of the OECD’s 
principle may be furthered to a degree, indicating prima 
facie regulatory success, it does not ensure delivery of the 
far more basic regulatory goal: the works actually being 
performed when required at the private cost of the operator. 
In the context of FARs, cost segregation must go together 
with cost internalization. The OECD’s principle—and its 
derivations—does not tell us this.
IV. The Responsibility Question
The previous part illustrated the limitations of pursuing 
bare (i.e., “unproductive”) cost internalization under the 
guise of the OECD’s polluter-pays principle as the overrid-
ing function of FARs for end-of-life obligations. This part 
examines whether the ascription of legal responsibility, 
specifically prospective/role-responsibility, provides a more 
appropriate normative function for FARs. Some concep-
tions of the polluter-pays principle, notably those imple-
mented under Canadian law, do present the ascription of 
responsibility to polluters as the dominant normative func-
tion of the principle.258
257. See, e.g., Ogus, supra note 192, at 19; Bergkamp, supra note 253, at 74.
258. For instance, in Canadian federal environmental legislation, furtherance 
of the polluter-pays principle is said to ensure “accountability” (Canada 
Oil and Gas Operations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c O-7, §2.1), recognize the “re-
sponsibility of users and producers in relation to toxic substances and pol-
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However, ideas of responsibility need not be examined 
solely through a polluter-pays lens. In fact, even where such 
ideas are discussed in the context of that principle, little 
work is done to unpack the difficult conceptual issues.259 
We see greater analytical value in distinguishing between 
the internalization of costs associated with end-of-life obli-
gations and the ascription of responsibility for them. Each 
has their own distinct narrative: addressing trade distor-
tion through economic means and imposing duties/obliga-
tions through legal measures, respectively.
A. The Role and Nature of “Forward-Looking” 
Responsibility
In this section, we draw upon the works of legal theorists 
Herbert Hart, Joel Feinberg, and Peter Cane, specifically 
their portrayal of role-/prospective responsibility to answer 
the responsibility question. We sketch these theories here 
before showing in Section IV.B how they may inform our 
account. The concept of “forward-looking” responsibility, 
viewed as a temporal component of the idea of responsibil-
ity, is underdeveloped in the legal and nonlegal literature. 
Indeed, as Cane observes, a significant proportion of the 
philosophical literature on responsibility concerns what it 
means to be responsible for some past situation or event 
(i.e., backward-looking), not what our responsibilities are 
(i.e., forward-looking).260
While scholars such as Cane have taken the ideas of 
role-/prospective responsibility forward in the general legal 
lutants and wastes” (Canadian Environmental Protection Act, S.C. 1999, 
c 33, pmbl.), and hold offenders “responsible” (Antarctic Environmental 
Protection Act, S.C. 2003, c 20, §50.9) for cleanup and restoration. And 
in Redwater, [2019] S.C.C. 5, para. 29 (internal citations omitted), Chief 
Justice Wagner held that Alberta’s abandonment regime “has the advantage 
of aligning with the polluter-pays principle, a well-recognized tenet of Ca-
nadian environmental law. This principle assigns polluters the responsibil-
ity for remedying environmental damage for which they are responsible, 
thereby incentivizing companies to pay attention to the environment in the 
course of their economic activities.” That said, remedying environmental 
damage, such as may be expected to occur, for example, following an oil 
spill, is different to undertaking end-of-life obligations of the restorative 
nature described in this Article. This is not acknowledged in Chief Justice 
Wagner’s statement.
259. For instance, the normative value in ensuring that polluters are responsible 
for their end-of-life obligations is recognized by the U.K. government in 
BEIS, Decommissioning of Offshore Renewable Energy Installa-
tions, supra note 121. In relation to its (discretionary) provisions for deal-
ing with the decommissioning of OREIs, the notes assert that a person who 
constructs, extends, operates, or uses an installation or related electric line 
“should be responsible for ensuring that it is decommissioned at the end of its 
useful life, and should be responsible for meeting the costs of decommission-
ing (the ‘polluter pays’ principle).” BEIS, Decommissioning of Offshore 
Renewable Energy Installations, supra note 121, at 7 (emphasis added).
 BEIS viewed this novel responsibility-focused conception of the prin-
ciple to be a “guiding principle” informing policy development in that area, 
particularly in relation to financial assurance for those costs. Id. at 34. The 
normative basis of that conception of the principle is not clear. It appears 
to be that the person(s) ought to pay for decommissioning because their 
relationship with the installation or electric line was sufficiently close. Their 
interaction with it created a responsibility to decommission it and to bear 
the costs of doing so. While BEIS does not elaborate on the complex ideas 
captured in this “forward-looking” sense of responsibility, it does list a range 
of “acceptable” measures that may be used by the parties to help them to 
shoulder it.
260. Peter Cane, Role Responsibility, 20 J. Ethics 279, 281 (2016).
literature,261 they have received no sustained treatment by 
environmental law and energy law scholars. They have not 
been considered at all in the context of FARs for end-of-life 
obligations. We believe that they provide a concrete basis 
upon which to rationalize the ascription of responsibility 
upon an actor for ensuring that some event occurs in the 
future and, in so doing, ground our analysis of the func-
tion of FARs. This is our specific contribution to the litera-
ture. The most significant works in this area are examined 
in chronological order to illustrate the evolution of thought 
on the topic.
1. Herbert Hart
In his essay “Responsibility and Retribution,” Hart 
acknowledged the breadth of ideas covered by the use of the 
expressions “responsibility,” “responsible,” and “responsible 
for” in and outside of the law.262 He provided four “heads” 
of classifying the different senses of the word “responsibil-
ity” and its grammatical cognates: (1) role-responsibility (for 
specific duties attached to a position or office occupied by 
a person); (2) causal-responsibility (for causing/producing 
certain consequences, results, or outcomes); (3) liability-
responsibility (a person’s connection with an act or harm is 
deemed sufficient for liability to attach under the law); and 
(4) capacity-responsibility (the normal capacities to conform 
to the requirements of law or morals, such as understand-
ing and control of conduct).263
While Hart’s account is directed at human beings in 
the context of the criminal law, valuable insights can be 
drawn from his taxonomy and applied sympathetically to 
obligations arising under environmental and energy law. 
Hart’s first “head,” role-responsibility, is most relevant to 
our study. Responsibilities under this head may be legal, 
moral, or they may fall outside of this dichotomy.264 It will 
arise “whenever a person occupies a distinctive place or office 
in a social organization, to which specific duties are attached 
to provide for the welfare of others or to advance in some 
specific way the aims or purposes of the organization.”265 
He defined “role” to include “a task assigned to any person 
by agreement or otherwise.”266 A person was, according to 
Hart, “responsible for the performance of these duties, or 
for doing what is necessary to fulfil them.”267 These duties 
were that person’s “responsibilities.”268 We will contend in 
Section IV.B.2 that an employee (or employees) of a regula-
tor whose position within that public organization requires 
that they oversee the operator’s delivery of financial assur-
ance falls within Hart’s formulation of role-responsibility.
In contrast to Feinberg and Cane, Hart placed little 
emphasis in his account on the idea of forward-looking 
responsibility. He saw liability-responsibility as the “pri-
261. See Peter Cane, Responsibility in Law and Morality (2002).
262. Herbert L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the 
Philosophy of Law 200 (2d ed. 2008).
263. Id. at 200.
264. Id. at 202.
265. Id. at 201 (emphasis added).
266. Id. (emphasis added).
267. Id. (emphasis added).
268. Id.
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mary” sense of responsibility.269 This “backward-looking” 
sense of responsibility meant that a person who failed to 
rebut a (criminal) charge against them was liable to pun-
ishment or blame for what they had done.270 The other 
senses of responsibility derived from it.271 For instance, 
causal-and capacity-responsibility were independent crite-
ria of it. Thus, it was appropriate not only for the word 
“responsible” to be used to describe the cumulative result 
of each criteria being satisfied (i.e., liability-responsibility), 
but also in relation to the result of an individual criterion 
being satisfied (i.e., a person is “responsible” if they cause 
harm).272 He viewed role-responsibility to be “less directly 
derivable” from liability-responsibility.273
There was, nevertheless, a connection in the sense that 
the occupant of a role is “contingently” responsible in that 
primary sense “if he fails to fulfil the duties which define 
his role and which are hence his responsibilities.”274 Thus, 
a person appointed to an office or position would be sub-
ject to liability-responsibility if he or she failed to fulfill the 
duties assigned to the role. Hart did not make clear if the 
criteria for ascribing liability-responsibility, such as causal-
responsibility and capacity-responsibility, must also be sat-
isfied in order to find a person to have role-responsibility. 
However, we assume this to be necessary and proceed upon 
that understanding.
2. Joel Feinberg
In his essay “Responsibility for the Future,” Feinberg placed 
greater emphasis than Hart did on the twin-faced nature of 
responsibility, observing that responsibility can be ascribed 
“before the fact” by persons whose eyes are on the future 
and “after the fact” by those, such as judges, who look to 
the past.275 Our interest lies in the forward-looking sense. 
He asserted that when we ascribe prospective responsibil-
ity we make a “hypothetical” pronouncement about the 
future: if some event fails to occur, such as performance of 
end-of-life obligations, then the person now judged respon-
sible for it (e.g., the operator) will be the proper subject 
of other judgments, such as blame or liability to punish-
ment.276 Those judgments are made retrospectively.277 There 
are, thus, two temporal components to the ascription of 
responsibility. The first is the ascription of responsibility for 
ensuring that some event occurs in the future. The second is 
the ascription of responsibility if that event does not occur.
Like Hart, the idea of duty was important to Feinberg’s 
account of responsibility. For Feinberg, “[t]ypically, our 
duties are to obey rules or authoritative commands.”278 We 
could, thus, say we have a duty to comply with the law 




273. Id. at 240-41.
274. Id.




278. Id. (emphasis added).
or some authorization conferred upon us (e.g., a permit). 
He classified a “duty” as a type of “prospective liability,” 
noting that “duties are meant to be taken seriously as 
standards of behavior.”279 Statements of duty were “not 
mere warnings of liability or ‘price-tags’ put on undesir-
able behavior.”280 The dereliction of a duty, in the sense of 
failing to perform it, was “morally or legally wrong, not 
merely imprudent or expensive.”281
An important observation made by Feinberg, and 
one that we will develop below, is that to say a person is 
“responsible” for ensuring that he or she does something 
at a future date—that the person is subject to a prospec-
tive responsibility, such as a duty—means that the person 
carries a “burden of vulnerability” on his or her shoul-
ders.282 That burden (or the “liability” associated with 
that responsibility) was vulnerability to sanctions, broadly 
defined to include punishment, blame, or condemna-
tion.283 When that person was judged (retrospectively) to 
be responsible for a failure to perform the duty, then that 
for which he or she was “liable” became real.284 There is, 
at that point, transition from vulnerability to sanctions to 
the imposition of sanctions. His use of the term liability in 
the context of duty, viewed as a category of prospective 
responsibility, reflects the idea that a person is at risk of 
a sanction being imposed upon them should they fail to 
fulfill that duty. While Feinberg’s “at risk” conception of 
liability differs from Hart’s ex post idea of liability-respon-
sibility, his account is still heavily reliant on sanctions in 
explaining responsibility.
Feinberg helps us to understand precisely to whom 
responsibilities, such as those prospectively ascribed, are 
owed. He draws an important distinction between respon-
sibilities in rem and responsibilities in personam, something 
that we develop below in Section IV.B.3. He contends that 
“[j]ust as a landowner has . . . ‘a right against the whole 
world’ to the private enjoyment of his property (no one can 
enter without his consent), so some of our social responsi-
bilities are, in a similar sense, to ‘the whole world.’”285 Fein-
berg, therefore, draws an analogy between “rights against” 
and “responsibilities to.” Rights and responsibilities differ 
markedly in nature. However, their outward direction of 
travel (i.e., person-world) is the same and this is what, per-
haps, provides the basis for their analogy. While he is refer-
ring to “social” responsibilities, not legal responsibilities, 
obeying a legal duty may be considered both a legal and 
social responsibility.
Feinberg refers to liabilities—in the “at risk” sense—to 
“universal but informal social responses” as “responsibilities 
in rem.”286 Sanctions such as blame and condemnation fit 
nicely into this categorization. And he refers to liabilities to 
“authoritative responses from definite assignable persons” 
279. Id. at 98 (emphasis added).
280. Id.
281. Id. (emphasis added).
282. Id. at 94.
283. Id. at 98.
284. Id. at 94.
285. Id. at 109 (emphasis added).
286. Id. (emphasis added).
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as “responsibilities in personam.”287 Sanctions imposed by or 
through the courts would appear to fit comfortably here. 
However, Feinberg observes that most of these in perso-
nam liabilities “also have a public dimension; and insofar 
as they also involve liability to such informal and unof-
ficial responses as praise and blame, they are also charac-
terizable as responsibilities in rem.”288 For instance, if an 
operator was prosecuted for failing to undertake a duty to 
which they were bound, then public condemnation of their 
behavior may follow.
3. Peter Cane
Cane took the twin-facing nature of legal responsibility 
significantly further forward than Feinberg. Surprisingly, 
he did not cite Feinberg in this aspect of his account, 
with Hart’s work featuring heavily. Cane saw “[i]deas 
such as accountability, answerability and liability” as 
“look[ing] backwards to conduct and events in the past” 
and “form[ing] the core” of what he termed “historic 
responsibility.”289 In contrast, “ideas of roles and tasks look 
to the future, and establish obligations and duties”—what 
he terms “prospective responsibilities.”290
Cane’s reliance upon Hart’s idea of role-responsibility in 
building his own account is evident from his use of the 
terms “roles,” “tasks,” and “duties” in much the same way 
as Hart. He also used the term “liability” differently than 
Feinberg. While for Cane and Hart it was an ex post idea, 
it was used by Feinberg principally to encapsulate ideas 
of vulnerability to sanctions (i.e., ex ante). Cane captures 
the twin-facing nature of legal responsibility neatly in his 
observation that “[a] person under a legal duty has a pro-
spective responsibility to fulfill that duty, and can be held 
historically responsible for failure to do so.”291
Unlike Hart, Cane brought prospective responsibil-
ity to the fore in his account of responsibility. He was 
critical of orthodox accounts of legal responsibility that 
he believed had “tend[ed] to focus on historic responsibil-
ity at the expense of prospective responsibility.”292 That 
focus may be explained by doctrinal scholarship that 
concentrates on the necessarily retrospective nature of 
judgments delivered by courts. Prospective responsibili-
ties were, according to Cane, equally important to our 
understanding of legal responsibility.293 An analytically 
valuable observation that he made and that distinguishes 
his account markedly from Hart’s and Feinberg’s was that 
historic legal responsibility was “parasitic on and subsid-
iary to prospective legal responsibility.”294
Historic responsibility, according to Cane, “enforces, 
reinforces and underwrites prospective responsibility” and 
was “not an end in itself, but only a means to the various ends 
the law seeks to further by creating and imposing prospec-
287. Id. (emphasis added).
288. Id.
289. Cane, supra note 261, at 31.
290. Id. (emphasis added).
291. Id. n.9 (emphasis added).
292. Id. at 31.
293. Id. at 34.
294. Id. at 35 (emphasis added).
tive responsibilities.”295 Prevention was “better than cure,” 
and the proper performance of prospective legal responsi-
bilities was more desirable than punishing nonfulfillment, 
or repair of its consequences.296 Regulatory requirements 
that attempt to avert damage to the environment, such as 
those that impose end-of-life obligations upon operators, 
illustrate when the prevention-focused nature of this obser-
vation is particularly pertinent.
According to the logic of Cane’s account of responsi-
bility, historic responsibility for failing to undertake end-
of-life obligations would be imposed upon an operator to 
steer them back toward fulfilling their duty (i.e., perform-
ing them), not to punish them.297 From this perspective, 
the dominant justification for ascribing legal responsibil-
ity for end-of-life obligations to an operator is to engen-
der their performance. While historic responsibility found 
its “role and meaning only in responding to nonfulfillment 
of prospective responsibilities,” he did acknowledge that 
it “may play a role in maximizing compliance with pro-
spective responsibilities.”298 This arose from its potential to 
encourage compliance, something that is picked up in the 
literature that considers the function of FARs.299
Cane divided prospective responsibilities into three cat-
egories: those directed to the production of good outcomes 
(which he terms “productive” responsibilities), those to the 
prevention of bad outcomes (which he terms “preventive” 
responsibilities), and those to the avoidance of bad out-
comes (which he terms “protective” responsibilities).300 For 
Cane, these responsibilities “play[ed] an important role in 
facilitating cooperative and value-generating human activ-
ity” and were often created by contract or agreement.301 
The only difference between preventive and protective 
responsibilities appears to be a minor linguistic one in that 
the former concerns the prevention of bad outcomes while 
the latter concerns the avoidance of such outcomes.
However, for Cane, the distinction is more marked. 
He makes clear that “[p]rotective obligations are directed 
against harming by misfeasance, whereas preventive 
obligations are directed against failing to prevent harm 
by nonfeasance.”302 Of the two, the latter categorization 
is more pertinent to end-of-life obligations. These are 
imposed upon operators to prevent them from deserting 
the site and failing to invest money in its safe closure and 
cleanup (i.e., to prevent environmental harm by nonfea-
sance). However, as we contend below, end-of-life obliga-
295. Id. (emphasis added).
296. Id.
297. This insight is borne out in the case law. In Orphan Well Ass’n v. Grant Thorn-
ton Ltd., Chief Justice Wagner of the Supreme Court of Canada held that 
the “ultimate goal” of the regulator in taking enforcement action against the 
operator (i.e., in imposing historic responsibility) was to have the environ-
mental work “actually performed.”) Redwater, [2019] S.C.C. 5, para. 128 
(emphasis added).
298. Id. (emphasis added).
299. Arnold, supra note 32, at 264 (emphasis added) (FARs “complement” 
command-and-control-style approaches to regulation); Gerard, supra note 
225, at 189 (“Bonding is a mechanism for enforcing contractual and regu-
latory provisions.”).
300. Cane, supra note 261, at 31-32.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 32.
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tions do not fall comfortably into these three categories. A 
new category is needed.
B. Ascription of Forward-Looking Responsibility 
as the Function of FARs
This section will show how the idea of forward-looking 
responsibility can inform our account. A central idea that 
we develop is that end-of-life obligations are not a mere 
“cost” to be internalized, as typically envisioned by con-
ceptions of the polluter-pays principle.303 They, or more 
accurately their proper performance, are more appropri-
ately conceptualized as a socially and environmentally 
important legal duty ascribed to operators. Regulators are 
ascribed with a distinct, but mutually supportive legal duty 
to ensure that end-of-life obligations are performed by 
operators in order to protect the environment and human 
health. FARs, we contend, ought to facilitate the timely 
and effective discharge of these duties.
1. Conceptualizing End-of-Life Obligations
The proper conceptual characterization of end-of-life obli-
gations is crucial to our account. We view them as tasks 
to be performed. They connect regulators and operators to 
other stakeholders in the project, including the environ-
ment, local communities, and the wider public. Regula-
tors impose them to protect those stakeholders. Operators 
undertake to perform them, facilitating that protection on 
their completion.
In the next subsection, we will contend that opera-
tors are responsible for performing their end-of-life obli-
gations and regulators are responsible for ensuring that 
they are performed. These are distinct responsibilities, 
but they seek to achieve the same end: completion of 
end-of-life obligations. When we say that each actor is 
responsible in this way, we mean they have been ascribed a 
prospective responsibility—a legal duty—that they must 
discharge.304 While we conceive of these as prospective 
responsibilities, it is difficult to categorize them using 
Cane’s taxonomy of prospective responsibilities: produc-
tive, preventive, and protective.
At first glance, completion of end-of-life obligations 
may be deemed to produce both a good outcome (i.e., 
restored, or at least improved, environmental quality) and 
prevent a bad outcome (e.g., pollution caused by a failure 
to plug and safely abandon an oil well). However, their 
proper categorization requires a more nuanced approach. 
The project may have resulted in significant environmen-
tal damage and deterioration at the site, such as may arise 
from groundwater and surface water pollution in the coal 
mining sector.305 Or it may be inadvisable to leave the site 
303. Mamlyuk, supra note 35, at 49.
304. See Cane, supra note 261, at 31; Feinberg, supra note 275, at 93.
305. For instance, a 2019 report by the Environmental Integrity Project found 
that “groundwater beneath virtually all coal plants is contaminated . . . The 
groundwater at a majority of coal plants (52 percent) has unsafe levels of 
arsenic .  .  . The majority of coal plants (60 percent) also have unsafe lev-
in a condition similar to that which it was before the energy 
project commenced.
For instance, the environmental impact of removing 
the pile footings of the foundations, cabling, and other 
infrastructure of offshore wind installations may be greater 
than leaving them in situ.306 While the framework govern-
ing the decommissioning of U.S. nuclear power reactors 
merely requires reduction of residual radioactivity to a level 
that permits “release” of the property for use.307 It neither 
requires elimination of radioactivity nor restoration of the 
property to its original, greenfield condition.308 In each 
example, the operator is unlikely to reach the original, pre-
activity baseline level of environmental quality at the site, 
even after completing the requisite tasks.
We propose an alternative category that we term restor-
ative responsibilities. This reflects the fact that end-of-life 
obligations, generally, seek to take the environment (land 
or marine) to an agreed state and prevent environmental 
impacts at the site from becoming more severe.309 The tasks 
may reduce the visual impact of the project on the land-
scape (e.g., reclamation of land used for surface coal min-
ing). They may also improve environmental quality at the 
site as opposed to “fixing” the damage and deterioration 
caused by the operator’s lawful but environmentally harm-
ful activities (e.g., decommissioning a nuclear reactor), 
enabling the site to be employed for another productive 
activity. Thus, while performance of end-of-life obligations 
may prevent a worse outcome from materializing (e.g., fur-
ther contamination of groundwater at a coal mine) and/
or produce a better outcome (e.g., lower residual levels of 
radioactivity at a former nuclear power plant), they do not 
prevent bad outcomes or produce good outcomes. The line 
is just not as clear-cut as that.
It is important to distinguish restorative responsibili-
ties—the tasks—from the pecuniary cost associated with 
their performance. Where these tasks are imposed under 
a permit, license, or other authorization, this will oblige 
the operator to incur a pecuniary cost when they are per-
formed.310 The scale of the cost will reflect the extent of 
the works required, ranging from tens of thousands of 
dollars for modest operations at a single site, to hundreds 
of millions of dollars for the largest or most complex.311 
However, the cost will, invariably, be calculated to reflect 
the pecuniary equivalent of the regulator (or, most likely, a 
contractor appointed by them) undertaking the works on 
the operator’s behalf.312 This may be significantly higher 
els of lithium.” Environmental Integrity Project, Coal’s Poisonous 
Legacy: Groundwater Contaminated by Coal Ash Across the U.S. 4 
(2019), https://environmentalintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/
National-Coal-Ash-Report-Revised-7.11.19.pdf.
306. Eva Topham & David McMillan, Sustainable Decommissioning of an Off-
shore Wind Farm, 102 Renewable Energy 470, 473-74 (2017).
307. 10 C.F.R. §50.2 (2020).
308. NRC, Regulatory Improvements for Power Reactors, supra note 78, 
at F-4.
309. Topham & McMillan, supra note 306, at 470.
310. Stoczkiewicz, supra note 29, at 176.
311. As we saw in the case study examining the decommissioning of nuclear 
power reactors in the United States in Section II.A.1, some plants are esti-
mated to cost $1 billion for licensees to decommission.
312. This is the case, for instance, under the U.S. SMCRA. 30 U.S.C. §1259(a); 
30 C.F.R. §800.14(b) (2018).
Copyright © 2020 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.
50 ELR 10596 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORTER 7-2020
(sometimes by three to five times) than if the cost were cal-
culated on the basis of the operator undertaking the work 
itself.313 The justification is that if the operator defaults on 
their obligations, then the regulator may need to step in to 
perform them or, more likely, hire a contractor to do so on 
its behalf.314 While that cost must be viewed as conceptu-
ally distinct from the tasks, it derives from the imposition 
of those tasks.
Conceptually, it may be viewed as appealing to conceive 
of the financial commitment accepted by the operator (i.e., 
the cost deriving from the prospective responsibility) as a 
debt owed by the operator to the state through the interme-
diary of the relevant regulator. Take the example of restor-
ative responsibilities estimated at $10,000,000 imposed by 
a regulator upon an operator under their license. From a 
“costs as debt” perspective, this would be viewed as a form 
of “credit” advanced to the operator by the state or through 
state resources with the requirement that the operator 
either undertake the works or pay the regulator the same. 
This could lead us to deem that an important regulatory 
function of FARs is to provide security for the advancement 
of that credit by the state.
While there may be value in the clarity of this per-
spective, the positive law of Canada and Scotland has 
been clear that the regulator ought not to be classified as 
a “creditor” of the operator with respect to the estimated 
cost of unfulfilled restorative responsibilities.315 Nor can 
the regulator be characterized as having advanced “credit” 
to the operator with respect to the costs of undertaking 
those unfulfilled obligations.
For instance, in Orphan Well Ass’n v. Grant Thornton 
Ltd., Chief Justice Richard Wagner of the Supreme Court 
of Canada held that the “ultimate goal” of the regulator 
in taking enforcement action against the operator (i.e., 
imposing retrospective responsibility) was to have the 
environmental work “actually performed for the benefit 
of third-party landowners and the public at large.”316 It 
was not attempting to recover a debt.317 Indeed, “[n]either 
the Regulator nor the Government of Alberta [stood] 
to benefit financially from the enforcement of these 
obligations.”318 And in a decision of the Outer House of 
the Court of Session of Scotland, Joint Liquidators of Doo-
nin Plant Ltd.,319 Lord Raymond Doherty held that while 
the operator had a statutory obligation to comply with the 
313. In the context of the Canadian mining sector, Etienne Guzman observes 
that the amount to be deposited has been estimated to be “three to five 
times higher than what the mining company would spend if it did the work 
itself.” Etienne Guzman, Canadian Financial Assurance Frameworks for the 
Remediation of Mining Sites: An Assessment of Ontario’s, British Columbia’s, 
and Quebec’s Schemes and Three Potential Reform Initiatives, 31 J. Envtl. L. 
& Prac. 1, 8 (2017).
314. Id.
315. The position is, however, different where the regulator “steps in” to under-
take the works on behalf of a recalcitrant operator and then seeks to recover 
these funds from it. There, the regulator would be treated as a creditor of 
the operator and would usually be permitted to prove for the associated 
costs—as a debt—in bankruptcy proceedings.
316. Redwater, [2019] S.C.C. 5, para. 128 (emphasis added).
317. Id. paras. 128, 135.
318. Id. para. 135.
319. 2019 S.L.T. 195.
relevant notice to undertake the closure works, it did not 
owe a debt to the regulator.320
These cases reinforce our feeling that the notion of tasks 
to be performed—and not debt—is the most appropriate 
characterization of end-of-life obligations and this is the 
basis upon which we proceed. Where restorative respon-
sibilities are imposed under a legal framework, the opera-
tor will be required as a matter of law to perform tasks 
specified by the regulator. These restorative responsibilities 
reflect a cost to the operator. However, they are not a debt 
in the sense that the regulator, in conferring the permit, 
license, or other authorization, ought to be treated as being 
owed a sum of money by the operator with respect to those 
costs. Where the regulator is forced to undertake the tasks 
on behalf of the operator and, thereby, incur a cost, then 
we can deem a debt to have been created in the regulator’s 
favor. Until that point, the relationship is merely one of 
regulator-regulatee.
2. What Is the Responsibility and 
to Whom Is It Ascribed?
Perhaps the most important prospective responsibility of 
the operator, at least in pecuniary terms, is to perform their 
restorative responsibilities. Where these tasks are ascribed 
to an operator, we deem the operator to be subject to a 
prospective responsibility under the public law—a legal 
duty—to perform them.321 This duty can be traced to the 
framework(s) governing the energy project and/or their 
permit, license, or other authorization. That instrument 
may be seen to reflect the terms upon which society tacitly 
allows the energy project to be conducted. The operator 
knowingly and willingly accepted those terms in com-
mencing the project, and ought not to be able to vary them 
unilaterally and retrospectively through the strategic use of 
bankruptcy law.
The unique role of the regulator in securing perfor-
mance of restorative responsibilities is underplayed in most 
accounts of the regulatory function of FARs.322 Indeed, 
many FARs are just not structured to confer this power. 
This is due to the flexibility they accord to operators to pro-
vide assurance at a time and in a manner that is commer-
cially convenient to them. The decommissioning of nuclear 
power reactors in the United States provides a pertinent 
example of this.323
However, we contend that the regulator ought to be 
viewed as subject to a prospective responsibility that is com-
plementary to that of the operator. This is to ensure that 
the operator’s restorative responsibilities are performed on 
time and at the operator’s own private cost. The regulator 
may discharge their duty through obtaining an appropriate 
guarantee from the operator to that effect. The regulator’s 
prospective responsibility may be traced to a duty prevalent 
320. Id. at 204 (Lord Doherty).
321. See Cane, supra note 261, at 31; Feinberg, supra note 275, at 93.
322. See the discussion in Part V.
323. See Section II.A.1.
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in frameworks across the energy sector.324 This is to protect 
the environment and human health in exercising its pow-
ers, albeit to be balanced delicately against a jurisdiction’s 
need for energy security.325 This may be augmented by the 
governing framework, which may impose further steward-
ship obligations upon the regulator (e.g., the AER’s protec-
tion of the Orphan Fund).
Operators and regulators will be subject to blame or 
liability to sanction (i.e., retrospective/historic responsibil-
ity) if they fail to discharge their duties.326 To draw upon 
Feinberg’s terminology, each actor carries a “burden” of 
vulnerability to sanctions, such as blame or condemnation 
in the public sphere. Failure to discharge their respective 
duties would not only be legally and morally wrong,327 it 
would be imprudent from an environmental and public 
health perspective. It may also be expensive for taxpay-
ers where the tasks had to be performed at public cost. 
Importantly, retrospective responsibility is ascribed to help 
facilitate the proper discharge of each party’s duties, not to 
punish them.328
From the operator’s perspective, the precise nature of 
the retrospective responsibility that can be ascribed to it 
324. For instance, in the United States, under 30 C.F.R. §585.102 (2019), 
“(a) BOEM will ensure that [renewable energy and alternate uses of exist-
ing facilities on the OCS] are carried out in a manner that provides for: 
(1) Safety; (2) Protection of the environment; (3) Prevention of waste; (4) Con-
servation of the natural resources of the OCS.” In relation to surface coal 
mining, 30 U.S.C. §1202 asserts that a core purpose of Chapter 25 “is 
to establish a nationwide program to protect society and the environment 
from the adverse effects of surface coal mining operations.” Under 10 C.F.R. 
§51.10(b) (2020), NRC “recognizes a continuing obligation to conduct its 
domestic licensing and related regulatory functions in a manner which is 
both receptive to environmental concerns and consistent with the Commis-
sion’s responsibility as an independent regulatory agency for protecting the 
radiological health and safety of the public.”
  In Alberta, under §2(1) of the Responsible Energy Development Act, 
S.A. 2012, c R-17.3, the mandate of the AER is
(a) to provide for the efficient, safe, orderly and environmentally 
responsible development of energy resources in Alberta through 
the Regulator’s regulatory activities, and (b)  in respect of energy 
resource activities, to regulate (i) the disposition and management 
of public lands, (ii) the protection of the environment, and (iii) the 
conservation and management of water.
In the Canadian nuclear sector, under §9(a)(i) of the Nuclear Safety and 
Control Act, S.C. 1997, c 9, the objectives of the CNSC are, inter alia,
(a) to regulate the development, production and use of nuclear en-
ergy and the production, possession and use of nuclear substanc-
es, prescribed equipment and prescribed information in order to 
(i) prevent unreasonable risk, to the environment and to the health 
and safety of persons, associated with that development, production, 
possession or use.
  And under §9(1) of the U.K.’s Energy Act 2004, the duty of the Nuclear 
Decommissioning Authority, in carrying out its functions, is to have partic-
ular regard to, inter alia, “(b) the need to safeguard the environment; (c) the 
need to protect persons from risks to their health and safety from activities in-
volving the use, treatment, storage, transportation or disposal of hazardous 
material; and (d) the need to preserve nuclear security.”
325. For instance, under 30 U.S.C. §1202, one of the core purposes of Chapter 
25, Surface Mining Control and Reclamation, is to “assure that the coal sup-
ply essential to the Nation’s energy requirements, and to its economic and 
social well-being is provided and strike a balance between protection of the 
environment and agricultural productivity and the Nation’s need for coal as 
an essential source of energy.”
326. See Feinberg, supra note 275, at 98. Boyd captures this idea from a sanction-
focused angle when he asserts that “restoration obligations create a future 
liability for failure to perform necessary reclamation or restoration.” Boyd, 
Financial Responsibility, supra note 11, at 1 n.2.
327. Feinberg, supra note 275, at 98.
328. See Cane, supra note 261, at 35.
will depend upon the legal framework under consider-
ation. Typically, it may include suspension or revocation 
of their permit, license, or other authorization for breach 
of its conditions; prosecution for breach of its conditions; a 
cost recovery action by the regulator with respect to sums 
incurred in undertaking the works on behalf of the opera-
tor; and/or censure or condemnation of the operator by 
the press and public for abandoning its obligations. From 
the regulator’s perspective, while it may not be “liable” in 
the sense of a successful legal action being brought against 
it, it may be liable in other ways. The regulator itself and, 
indeed, certain officers may be subject to censure or to 
condemnation in parliamentary inquiries, independent 
reviews, or in local and/or national press for their role in 
the operator’s failure to perform the works.329
For our purposes, there is a more subtle and thought-
provoking ascription of prospective responsibility that war-
rants consideration. Hart’s conception of role-responsibility 
provides an interesting foundation from which to ascribe 
responsibility to those officers of the regulator charged with 
overseeing the delivery and maintenance of financial assur-
ance by operators. Here, we view role-responsibility as a dis-
tinct type of prospective responsibility. Recall that Hart’s 
account pertains to the responsibility of human beings, 
not corporations or public institutions. To be true to his 
account, we must focus upon the responsibility of officers 
of a public institution, such as a regulator, as opposed to 
that of the public institution itself.
According to Hart, role-responsibility arises whenever 
a person occupies a “distinctive place or office in a social 
organization, to which specific duties are attached to pro-
vide for the welfare of others or to advance in some spe-
cific way the aims or purposes of the organization.”330 That 
person is responsible for discharging those duties. An offi-
cer of a regulator whose position within that organization 
requires that the officer ensure that an operator’s delivery 
of financial assurance complies with the public law and the 
regulator’s published policy appears to fall within this for-
mulation. We might say that they have role-responsibility. 
They occupy a distinctive office in a social organization, 
terms that Hart neither defined nor expanded upon, and 
would be subject to duties to both “provide for the welfare 
of others” and “advance . . . the aims or purposes of the 
organization.” The duty to protect the environment and 
human health when exercising their powers, an explicit 
feature of many legal frameworks in the energy sector,331 
pervade both requirements.
329. For instance, following a series of high-profile bankruptcies of coal compa-
nies operating in the East Ayrshire region of Scotland and the consequential 
failure to perform vastly expensive, extensive end-of-life obligations, East 
Ayrshire Council agreed to an independent review of the planning processes 
pertaining to opencast coal operations in the region. The report was damn-
ing: “The failings are many and varied but at their core lie significant and 
ongoing individual, management and communication failings, particularly 
within the planning service.” Report of Independent Review of Regula-




330. Hart, supra note 262, at 201 (emphasis added).
331. See supra note 324.
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It is, however, important to recognize that the officers’ 
decisions are likely to be constrained by the text of any rel-
evant legislation and, importantly, the policies drafted by 
the regulator. Regulators will publish guidance setting out 
their preference (or otherwise) for certain financial assur-
ance measures and the way assurance is to accumulate.332 
This limits the applicability of Hart’s role-responsibility 
in the context of this Article. Where it is the policies of 
the regulator that have resulted in the delivery of ineffica-
cious financial assurance by operators, then the regulator 
should be held retrospectively responsible (in addition to 
the operator), not the officer(s). The officer(s) will, after all, 
have a role-responsibility to follow regulator’s policies in 
the course of their employment.
3. To Whom Is the Responsibility Owed?
If we are to assert that operators and regulators are ascribed 
with forward-looking responsibilities of the types set out 
above, we must, for the sake of conceptual clarity, consider 
to whom those responsibilities are owed. Feinberg’s account 
helps us to elucidate this. For Feinberg, that question is 
answered by establishing the party or parties to whom the 
operator or regulator is “liable.” Put another way, a respon-
sibility was owed where a liability existed. He used the 
terms “liable” and “liabilities” quite differently than Hart 
and Cane. While they used them in a retrospective/historic 
sense, he used them in a prospective sense to reflect the idea 
that a party was at risk of a sanction being imposed upon 
them should they fail to fulfill a duty ascribed to them.
His account comprised two types of liabilities. First, 
liabilities to “universal but informal social responses”333 
(e.g., public condemnation). These “responsibilities in rem” 
were owed to the “whole world.” Second, liabilities to 
“authoritative responses from definite assignable persons”334 
(e.g., prosecution). He termed these “responsibilities in per-
sonam.” Thus, for Feinberg, it was the nature and source of 
the pertinent response that underpinned his categorization 
of responsibilities as either in rem or in personam. He did, 
however, observe that many responsibilities in personam also 
had a public dimension and so could also be characterized 
as responsibilities in rem.
The idea of in rem or in personam responsibilities may be 
applied to restorative responsibilities. The position of the 
operator will be examined first. The positive law of England 
and Wales offers useful initial doctrinal guidance to deter-
mine the parties from whom the possible responses—social 
and/or authoritative—may come. This, in turn, enables us 
to determine to whom in rem and/or in personam responsi-
bilities may be owed.
Under the law of England and Wales, the permit, 
license, or other authorization (e.g., planning consent), of 
which the restorative responsibilities are usually a key com-
332. For instance, in the U.K., BEIS provides guidance notes on acceptable 
forms of security, where this is required under §38(4) of the Petroleum Act 
1998, to cover decommissioning costs associated with offshore oil and gas 
installations and pipelines. BEIS, Guidance Notes, supra note 154.
333. Feinberg, supra note 275, at 109 (emphasis added).
334. Id. (emphasis added).
ponent, may be viewed as constituting a statutory autho-
rization enabling the holder—usually the operator—to 
undertake activity that would otherwise be unlawful.335 In 
conferring these authorizations, which will impose obliga-
tions upon the operator, the relevant regulator “acts pursu-
ant to its statutory duties and functions.”336 There is “no 
intention to enter into any private law legal relations” with 
the regulatee.337 Upon this logic, the operator’s duty to per-
form restorative responsibilities is properly viewed as aris-
ing under the public law, via a public law instrument, and 
not through any legal relation created by private law (i.e., 
contractual).338 This is true even though certain terms, such 
as the measure(s) to be utilized by operators to satisfy FARs 
and the manner in which the funds must accumulate, are 
likely to be subject to negotiation with the regulator.
We can derive an answer to the question as to whom the 
duty to perform restorative responsibilities is owed by con-
sidering who has the power to enforce their performance 
(i.e., require that they be discharged).339 This may be estab-
lished by examining the governing statute/legal frame-
work. As it is usually the regulator that requires that they 
be discharged,340 the prospective responsibility ought to be 
viewed as owed to the regulator. It is the “definite assign-
able person” who will deliver the “authoritative response,” 
meaning that we can, in fact, model the duty upon Fein-
berg’s conception of responsibilities in personam. The opera-
tor is vulnerable to sanctions, such as formal enforcement 
action brought by the regulator, until it performs its restor-
ative responsibilities.
However, the contention that restorative responsibili-
ties ought to be owed to the regulator does contrast with 
an alternative stance in the positive law of Canada. There, 
it has been held that restorative responsibilities are owed 
to the public at large. This chimes with Feinberg’s notion 
of responsibilities in rem. For instance, Chief Justice James 
H. Laycraft in Northern Badger held that the obligation 
to abandon wells imposed upon licensees by the general 
law of Alberta was not one owed by the licensee to the 
regulator, but was rather a “public duty” owed to their 
“fellow citizens.”341 This was affirmed by Chief Justice 
Wagner in Redwater.342
335. In relation to the law of England and Wales, see, for example, R (Data 
Broadcasting International Ltd.) v. Office of Communications, [2010] 
E.W.H.C. 1243, para. 88, and Floe Telecom v. Ofcom, [2009] E.W.C.A. 
Civ. 47, para. 103.
336. Data Broad., [2010] E.W.H.C. 1243, para. 88.
337. Id.
338. Re Mineral Res. Ltd., [1999] B.C.C. 422, 440; Data Broad., [2010] 
E.W.H.C. 1243, para. 88 (Cranston, J.).
339. In Newfoundland & Labrador v. AbitibiBowater Inc., 2012 S.C.C. 67, [2012] 
2 S.C.R. 443, para. 46, Justice Marie Deschamps held that the question to 
whom the obligation to remediate contaminated land is owed “is answered 
by the statute, which determines who can require that it be discharged.”
340. See, e.g., §37(1) of the U.K. Petroleum Act 1998 (“If an abandonment 
programme approved by the Secretary of State is not carried out .  .  . the 
Secretary of State may by written notice require any of the persons who 
submitted the programme to take such remedial action as may be specified 
in the notice within such time as may be so specified.”).
341. Panamericana de Bienes y Servicios S.A. v. Northern Badger Oil & Gas 
Ltd., 1991 A.B.C.A. 181, 81 Alta. L.R.2d 45, para. 33.
342. As stated in Redwater, [2019] S.C.C. 5, para. 135:
The end-of-life obligations the Regulator seeks to enforce against 
Redwater are public duties. Neither the Regulator nor the Govern-
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This position is open to challenge. Greater coherence 
may be brought to the analysis, we submit, if the duty is 
viewed as owed principally to the regulator, for it has the 
power to enforce those obligations. It can hold the opera-
tor retrospectively responsible through the imposition of a 
cost recovery action should the operator fail to discharge its 
duty. The public cannot. Benefiting from a legal duty—in 
the sense of being owed that duty—offers no comfort to 
the beneficiary unless they also have the ability to enforce a 
breach of it or to hold the operator retrospectively respon-
sible should it fail to discharge it.
That said, wider society and the environment itself ben-
efit directly (a cleaner environment) and indirectly (more 
public funds) from the operator’s completion of the works. 
The reverse is also true. In Redwater, Chief Justice Wagner 
emphasized that “third-party landowners and the public at 
large” were the beneficiaries of end-of-life obligations, not 
the regulator.343 And Justice David Neuberger held in Re 
Mineral Resources, a decision of the High Court of Eng-
land and Wales, that closure obligations imposed under a 
license were “for the benefit of the environment” and it was 
the “general public” that would be the “loser” where the 
works were not completed by the operator.344
These are anthropocentric positions—the environment 
will be impacted heavily—but the sentiment that the public 
and the environment itself are beneficiaries of public duties 
owed by the operator is conceptually appealing. These cases 
provide doctrinal support for Feinberg’s idea of in personam 
liabilities that also have a “public dimension.”345 Where 
the operator was exposed, in addition to an authoritative 
response from the regulator, to blame or condemnation 
in the public sphere for failing to fulfill their restorative 
responsibilities, then this ought rightly to be characterized 
as a situation where both responsibilities in personam and 
responsibilities in rem arose.
The position is more complex when we consider to whom 
the prospective responsibility ascribed to the regulator is 
owed. According to Feinberg, liabilities to “authoritative 
responses” from “definite assignable persons” are neces-
sary for characterization as a responsibility in personam.346 
We have largely eliminated the prospect of an officer (or 
officers) being found subject to liability-responsibility for 
failure to shoulder their role-responsibility where it was 
the regulator’s policies that resulted in the delivery of inef-
ficacious financial assurance. We are left to consider the 
wider ascription of prospective responsibility to the regula-
tor to protect the environment and human health. Where 
a regulator tolerates inefficacious financial assurance that 
cannot guarantee that the operator is able to perform their 
restorative responsibilities, then the regulator has failed to 
discharge the duty ascribed to it. There does not, however, 
appear to be a “definite assignable person” who will deliver 
ment of Alberta stands to benefit financially from the enforcement 
of these obligations. These public duties are owed, not to a creditor, 
but, rather, to fellow citizens, and are therefore outside the scope of 
“provable claims.”
343. Id. para. 128.
344. Re Mineral Res. Ltd., [1999] B.C.C. 422, 432-33 (Neuberger, J.).
345. Feinberg, supra note 275, at 109.
346. Id.
the “authoritative response.” In these circumstances, there 
is no regulator of the regulator.
We do, however, find Feinberg’s conception of respon-
sibilities in rem to be relevant. This idea captures “social 
responsibilities” owed to the “whole world.”347 It may be 
going too far to assert that obtaining efficacious financial 
assurance is a social responsibility owed to the whole world, 
but we consider it logical to assert that it is one owed to 
communities located close to the energy project, and 
wider society. Restorative responsibilities are a burden that 
these stakeholders will bear where the operator is unable 
or unwilling to perform them. Thus, while performance 
of restorative responsibilities is both the operator’s and 
the regulator’s responsibility, where this does not occur, it 
becomes society’s problem. Society relies on the regulator to 
prevent this outcome from materializing.
For Feinberg, in order to be characterized as a respon-
sibility in rem, there must be a liability to a universal but 
informal social response.348 The prospect of censure and 
condemnation in local communities, the national press, 
and the debating chambers of parliaments arising where 
operators utilize bankruptcy law to evade their restorative 
responsibilities may be viewed as the informal retrospective 
social response of blame. Thus, the prospective responsibil-
ity of the regulator to seek an appropriate guarantee that 
the operator’s restorative responsibilities will be performed 
is not just a formal one deriving from their statutory func-
tion to protect the environment and human health when 
exercising their powers, but an informal one owed to society.
V. Realizing the Function of FARs 
for Restorative Responsibilities
This part captures our account of the function of FARs 
for restorative responsibilities and illustrates how it could 
inform the better design of FARs. We contend that the 
first-order function of FARs ought to be to empower opera-
tors and regulators to discharge specific legal responsi-
bilities—or duties—ascribed to each of them. These are 
quite separate prospective responsibilities, but they share a 
common goal, specifically timely completion of restorative 
responsibilities. The operator’s prospective responsibility is 
to perform their restorative responsibilities in accordance 
with their permit, license, or other authorization at its own 
private cost. In contrast, the regulator’s prospective respon-
sibility is to ensure that this occurs through obtaining an 
appropriate guarantee from the operator.
Before proceeding, it is useful to consider how our 
position sits with the existing literature. David Gerard 
presents our empowerment position slightly differently 
when he observes that “[b]onding is a mechanism for 
enforcing contractual [e.g., obligations under a lease] and 
regulatory provisions.”349 This capacity derives from the 
fact that operators are required to post a bond with the 
regulator that will only be released when reclamation is 
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Gerard, supra note 225, at 189 (emphasis added).
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complete.350 If reclamation does not occur, the bond will 
be forfeited and the funds used to finance the unfulfilled 
reclamation requirements.
Mark Kaiser and Brian Snyder adopt a similar position, 
asserting that financial assurance “help[s] ensure that oper-
ators comply with all regulatory and lease agreements.”351 
And for Zachary Arnold, FARs “complement” command-
and-control-style approaches to regulation “which pre-
scribe duties that might otherwise be avoided through 
. . . liability-limiting mechanisms,” such as incorporating 
entities with low levels of capitalization.352 The presence of 
adequate funds—an ability to pay—would enable the pre-
scribed duties to be complied with. Relatedly, Malone and 
Winslow contend that the purpose of FARs “is to guaran-
tee that a private operator can cover any present and future 
environmental costs of his or her activities.”353
For these authors, the primary function of FARs is to 
facilitate regulatory compliance with environmental obli-
gations and, in that respect, resembles our proposed func-
tion of FARs. However, the authors’ accounts differ from 
ours in three important respects. First, they do not draw 
out, and distinguish between, the two different types of 
legal responsibilities (i.e., prospective and retrospective) 
to which operators and regulators are (or, in the case of 
retrospective responsibility, may be) subject. Nor do they 
explain the essential interaction between them in facilitat-
ing compliance with a prospective responsibility.354 We, 
therefore, provide a more complete account of how FARs 
facilitate compliance.
Second, they do not acknowledge the different but mutu-
ally supportive prospective responsibilities of operators and 
regulators. Indeed, the crucial role played by the regulator 
in ensuring that restorative responsibilities are performed 
by the operator—and the environment and human health 
protected—through obtaining an appropriate guarantee 
that this will occur is absent in their accounts.
Third, and relatedly, there is the presumption in each of 
the accounts that FARs—or more specifically the measures 
used by operators to satisfy them—automatically engender 
compliance with environmental obligations. This degree of 
certainty cannot be provided. There are a variety of mea-
sures, as we have seen, that are entirely ill-equipped to do 
so yet are still described as acceptable forms of financial 
assurance. We take a more nuanced position on terms such 
as “cover” that would ensure that the operator could per-
form their restorative responsibilities with the assurance 
350. Id.
351. Mark J. Kaiser & Brian Snyder, Offshore Wind Decommissioning Regulations 
and Workflows in the Outer Continental Shelf United States, 36 Marine Pol’y 
113, 120 (2012) (“Securities help ensure that operators comply with all 
regulatory and lease requirements, including rents, royalties, environmental 
damage cleanup and restoration activities, decommissioning and site clear-
ance, and other lease obligations.”).
352. Arnold, supra note 32, at 264 (emphasis added).
353. Malone & Winslow, supra note 14, at 3 (emphasis added). Kaiser and Sny-
der adopt a similar position, asserting that the objective of a bonding pro-
gram is to ensure that regulated entities “provide or demonstrate adequate 
financial resources to protect the government from incurring any financial 
loss.” Kaiser & Snyder, supra note 351, at 120.
354. Cane, supra note 261, at 35 (historic (i.e., retrospective) legal responsibility 
was “parasitic on and subsidiary to prospective legal responsibility”).
they had provided. As we have seen, terms such as “cover” 
are legally ambiguous and should be avoided.
To return to our account, we contend that the empow-
ering quality of FARs is most effectively achieved through 
ensuring sufficient capital reserves are ring-fenced by oper-
ators from the claims of their creditors in bankruptcy. The 
forced segregation of funds necessary to create this reserve 
helps us to generate our second-order function of FARs: 
productive cost internalization. This function, which is 
dependent upon successful delivery of the first-order func-
tion, enables furtherance of the venerable policy objectives 
that the OECD emphasized in originating its conception 
of the polluter-pays principle. Recall that this was engen-
dering more rational, sustainable consumption and pro-
duction patterns and avoiding distortions in trade and 
investment. The latter objective is particularly pertinent 
given the trade-subsidizing effects of a jurisdiction’s absent 
or inefficacious FARs as described in Part II.
FARs have a critical role to play in establishing precisely 
how and when productive cost internalization by the oper-
ator is to occur, what should happen to those funds, who 
should have access to them, and when that access should 
be granted. They facilitate a form of external legal control 
by the regulator over the way the operator finances per-
formance of their prospective responsibility (i.e., precisely 
how and when they will internalize the costs associated 
with their restorative responsibilities). Their codification 
and elaboration in guidance documents for industry will 
provide coherence and concrete legal structure to the eco-
nomic idea of cost internalization. Without that external 
control, operators may not be sufficiently motivated to pro-
vide the type and amount of assurance necessary to per-
form their restorative responsibilities when required.
Our idea of productive cost internalization need not 
be fostered under the explicit guise of a “polluter pays”-
styled principle, and it could exist as a far more implicit 
goal in legal frameworks. The latter approach would avoid 
the need to displace common conceptions amongst law-
yers of it primarily being a retrospective, liability-focused 
principle of environmental law.355 However, the principle 
could provide a useful threshold test, much in the same 
way as it is used in the context of the state aid rules under 
EU law,356 to determine whether state subsidization was 
occurring and, if so, to what degree. Ultimately, the choice 
whether to incorporate it under the label of a polluter-pays 
principle will be down to the domestic legal culture of the 
jurisdiction at hand and the way in which the principle is 
understood and applied there.
We now move to consider how this account could inform 
the better design of FARs. When it comes to their design, 
the devil is, of course, in the detail. The intricacies of the 
proper design of FARs cannot be set out here. We merely 
propose some high-level issues to focus upon. A key fac-
tor to consider is how FARs ought to ascribe responsibility. 
This concerns the level of external control that the FARs 
355. Dirk Heine et al., The Polluter-Pays Principle in Climate Change Law: An 
Economic Appraisal, 10 Climate L. 94, 95 (2020).
356. de Sadeleer, supra note 30, at 463-64.
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ought to have over the way in which restorative responsi-
bilities are financed. Reducing the discretion afforded to 
regulators through greater prescription under the FARs 
of (1) acceptable financial assurance measures, and (2) the 
way funds must accumulate, to guarantee performance of 
restorative responsibilities, should be the focus.
As we saw in the case studies covered in Section II.A, 
FARs are often drafted in a manner that leaves a high level 
of discretion to the regulator relating to how—and in the 
case of the decommissioning of OREIs in English or Welsh 
waters, if—assurance is to be provided. The specificities of 
the “real world” delivery of assurance are often just not 
catered for in the framework itself. It is the guidance issued 
by the regulator and, perhaps more importantly, the subse-
quent discussion and negotiation that takes place with the 
operator that brings the financial assurance into fruition.
For instance, operators and regulators will bargain 
between themselves in relation to the precise form(s) that 
financial assurance is to take and how the assurance accu-
mulates (i.e., lump-sum or staggered payments). Therefore, 
to a large degree, the financial assurance provided derives 
from a process of negotiated agreement between the opera-
tor and the regulator.357 Limiting the discretion afforded 
to regulators will minimize the prospect for indirect state 
subsidization of the operator’s activities. This may be con-
sidered more likely to arise in FARs that exhibit high levels 
of regulatory discretion. It was seen in Section II.C that 
indirect state subsidization generates a competitive advan-
tage at the domestic and international levels for operators 
trading from jurisdictions with the prospect of a high 
assurance deficit. A more prescriptive approach to accept-
able financial measures and methods of accumulation in a 
state’s FARs would help resolve this.
That FARs must guarantee performance of restorative 
responsibilities—in the sense of ensuring that this duty 
will be discharged at the operator’s private cost—offers 
a stable normative position from which to steer this leg-
islative prescription. Indeed, we contend that this is the 
foundation from which FARs should be constructed. To 
be clear, financial assurance does not, per se, guarantee 
performance.358 As we saw from the case studies in Section 
II.A, the realization of that outcome will depend upon the 
precise measure, or combination of measures, accepted by 
the regulator, and the manner in which the funds are per-
mitted to accumulate during the project’s operational life. 
When evaluating particular financial assurance measures, 
we see a weak-to-strong form spectrum of likelihood that the 
tasks will be actually performed, with self-bonding at one 
end (weak) of the spectrum and full, upfront cash deposits 
with a regulator at the other (strong).359
357. Gerard, supra note 225, at 190 (“In the case of US mining, the envi-
ronmental standards stipulated in operating permits are often a product 
of negotiations between the regulatory agency (the principal) and the 
regulated firm (the agent) where environmental laws provide a baseline 
[sic] negotiations.”).
358. Malone & Winslow, supra note 14, at 3.
359. See GAO, GAO-05-658, Environmental Liabilities: EPA Should Do 
More to Ensure That Liable Parties Meet Their Cleanup Obliga-
tions 42-43 (2005), https://www.gao.gov/assets/250/247469.pdf.
Different measures sit at various points along this spec-
trum.360 The closer the marker is to the weak end, the 
greater the risk to the environment, public health, and pub-
lic funds. The reverse is also true. The tolerable level of risk 
is, ultimately, a political decision but one that has impli-
cations for domestic and international trade. Where the 
original cost estimate of undertaking the future works is 
accurate—and this, in itself, is no easy task—certain mea-
sures, when utilized properly (i.e., an adequately capitalized 
escrow account segregated from licensee assets, outside its 
administrative control, and accessible by the regulator), 
increase the likelihood that the tasks will be performed at 
the operator’s private cost.
But as soon as performance is rendered conditional 
upon the financial strength of the operator or some third 
party, such as providers of bonds, bank guarantees, and/or 
a parent or affiliate company, then the financial value (and 
overall legal credibility) of that guarantee wanes. Unless 
specific and sufficient assets or funds are ring-fenced from 
the reach of their creditors, there is the risk that should 
their financial position deteriorate, then they may be 
unable to bear those costs. It is not just operators and their 
parent or affiliate companies that are exposed to the risk of 
bankruptcy. As we know, banks and insurers can and do 
become bankrupt. Strictly, performance can, in our view, 
only be guaranteed where a fully funded capital reserve 
dedicated to undertaking the works is mandated via FARs.
To fulfill their first- and second-order functions, it is our 
view that FARs should prescribe that the full estimated 
costs of performing restorative responsibilities must be 
placed in a capital reserve with a third party in favor of the 
regulator.361 This would be done prior to operations com-
mencing on-site. The first-best option would be for deposit-
based measures, such as trust funds or a bank account in 
favor of the regulator, to be the only means of evidencing 
assurance in the mid-to-long term. And there ought to be 
a prescribed requirement for lump-sum deposit-based mea-
sures rather than accumulating deposit-based measures.
Financial strength-based measures, such as self-bonding 
and parent company guarantees, ought to be prohibited 
explicitly under the pertinent legal framework or in the 
guidance published by the regulator. Lump-sum deposit-
based measures are best placed to enable operators to 
shoulder their prospective responsibilities and, in turn, 
facilitate productive cost internalization. They are also the 
clearest examples of measures that show the operator has 
the ability and intention to bear the costs of their restorative 
responsibilities. These are two essential features of effica-
cious FARs.
An operator could demonstrate current ability to pay 
through, for example, satisfaction of financial tests as per 
the usual requirements of self-bonding. However, that abil-
360. Id.
361. Dana & Wiseman, supra note 9, at 1530:
Reserving [a] pool of money is critical because, absent such funds, 
there is a high likelihood that operators or public actors will never 
undertake environmental remediation. Abandoned wells and mines 
are commonplace, and “orphan” contaminated industrial waste can 
be found in virtually every city. Even where such sites pose environ-
mental and health risks, no action is what we often observe.
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ity will evaporate if the operator’s financial position dete-
riorates. They may (or may not) have an initial intention 
to pay. Even where that intention existed at the outset, it 
may change following a collapse in the commodity’s value 
or contraction in demand for it. The point to emphasize 
is that while the regulator may believe that it can gauge 
the operator’s ability to pay, it cannot gauge the operator’s 
intention to pay. It is our position that a financial assur-
ance measure should not be accepted by a regulator unless 
both the ability and intention of the operator to pay can be 
ensured through the external legal control generated under 
the FARs.
We recognize that our first-best option may be unat-
tainable for many socially valuable projects and for all but 
the largest of operators. Thus, we would enable an opera-
tor that could demonstrate that the first-best option would 
impose “undue financial hardship” upon it to default to 
our second-best option. This would be for a bank guaran-
tee purchased from a third-party provider to be used ini-
tially as funds accumulated in line with a strict time line 
to achieve the appropriate target sum in the capital reserve. 
The sum guaranteed by the bank would decrease propor-
tionately in line with an increase in the accumulating cash 
deposit. This option would be permissible for the first three 
to five years, with a mandatory transfer to the first-best 
option after this period ended or they would risk their per-
mit, license, or other authorization being suspended until 
the deficit was redressed.
If the second-best option was still not viable for an opera-
tor, they would need to think more carefully about compart-
mentalizing the stages or phases of the planned operations, 
with smaller parcels of land/sea being used or projected 
levels of activity reduced. Or, where the facility or plant 
was not yet constructed, its scale may need to be reevalu-
ated. With reductions in operational scale, the financial 
scale of the restorative responsibilities (and the associated 
costs of undertaking them) would reduce proportionally. 
The operator would not be permitted to enter a new stage 
or phase unless the appropriate form and level of assurance 
was provided in advance. When used in conjunction with 
the recommendations outlined above, more rigorous and 
considered regulatory oversight of the staging and phasing 
of operations affords a ready solution to the legal problem 
identified in this Article.
VI. Conclusion
This Article sought to derive a normative account of the 
function of FARs for end-of-life obligations (what we 
termed “restorative responsibilities”) in the energy sector. 
Our aim was to inform the better design of FARs. Our 
study was prompted by the fact that many FARs across 
North America and the U.K. are either failing, or exhibit 
clear signs of failing in the future. They are often absent in 
frameworks governing the renewable energy sector. Absent 
or inefficacious FARs are resulting, and will result, in sig-
nificant cost savings for operators and, indeed, entire sub-
sectors. This is artificially reducing the cost of producing 
the energy (e.g., nuclear, renewable) and extracting the fuel 
source (i.e., coal, oil and gas). We characterized this as a 
form of indirect state subsidization of operators’ end-of-life 
obligations that created potential for distortion in trade.
We found there to be some important conceptual limi-
tations associated with pursuing cost internalization as the 
overriding function of FARs for end-of-life obligations. 
Cost internalization has been the dominant normative 
position adopted in most discussions of environmental 
liability, particularly those centering on the polluter-
pays principle. However, there is substantial conceptual 
uncertainty as to precisely what the economic idea of cost 
internalization means for, and requires from, operators in 
strict legal terms. Further, the fact that costs have been 
reflected in the costs of producing energy or extracting 
raw materials (i.e., internalized by the operator) does not 
mean that the funds necessary to complete the requisite 
future works are secure or sufficient in the event of the 
operator’s bankruptcy.
Our account was built upon the legal theory pertaining 
to forward-looking responsibility. We began by introduc-
ing a new category of prospective responsibility—restor-
ative responsibilities—to deal with the uniquely restorative 
nature of the works associated with end-of-life obligations. 
They are neither purely preventive, nor purely remedial. 
Our categorization reflects the fact that restorative respon-
sibilities seek to take the environment to an agreed state 
and prevent environmental impacts at the site from becom-
ing more severe. The works seek to improve environmen-
tal quality rather than “fix” the damage or deterioration 
caused by the operator’s lawful but environmentally harm-
ful activities.
We argued that the first-order function of FARs ought to 
be to empower both regulators and operators to fulfill their 
prospective responsibilities. The proper performance of 
restorative responsibilities ought to be viewed as an impor-
tant legal duty ascribed prospectively to operators under 
the public law. A core prospective responsibility of the 
regulator ought to be to ensure that performance occurs, 
principally by obtaining an appropriate guarantee from the 
operator. Each actor may be held retrospectively respon-
sible for their failure to fulfill their duty. The empower-
ing quality of FARs would most effectively be achieved 
through regulators ensuring sufficient capital reserves are 
ring-fenced by operators from the claims of their creditors 
in bankruptcy.
The forced segregation of funds necessary to create this 
reserve helps us to generate our second-order function of 
FARs: productive cost internalization. Cost internalization 
plus forced segregation was shown to increase the likeli-
hood that restorative responsibilities will be performed. It 
also ensures furtherance of the venerable policy objectives 
that the OECD emphasized in originating its polluter-pays 
principle, specifically engendering more rational, sustain-
able consumption and production patterns and avoiding 
distortions in international trade and investment. The 
latter objective is particularly pertinent considering the 
transnational implications of absent or inefficacious FARs. 
FARs have a critical role to play in establishing precisely 
how and when productive cost internalization by the oper-
Copyright © 2020 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.
7-2020 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORTER 50 ELR 10603
ator is to occur, what should happen to those funds, who 
should have access to them, and when that access should 
be granted. They ought to be viewed as facilitating a form 
of external legal control by the regulator over the way in 
which the operator finances performance of their restor-
ative responsibilities.
For Cane, “[a] well-functioning and successful legal sys-
tem is one in which the noncompliance with prospective 
responsibilities, and hence occasions for the imposition of 
historic responsibility, are minimised.”362 Well-designed 
FARs minimize the prospect of an operator’s noncompli-
ance with their restorative responsibilities and the need for 
retrospective responsibility to be imposed by regulators 
through, for example, attempted cost recovery actions. Our 
account offers a theoretical framework to deliver this. It is 
362. Cane, supra note 261, at 35.
timely, given that jurisdictions such as Canada and the U.K. 
currently lack automatic (i.e., non-discretionary) FARs for 
end-of-life obligations in the renewable energy sector.
Our solution is prescriptive, which is often unwelcomed 
by industry. This is never truer than where it results in 
increased (albeit not new) costs for operators. However, 
only when such a system is implemented will the necessary 
works actually be performed consistently by operators, the 
distortion of trade and investment described here redressed, 
and more responsible, sustainable corporate conduct across 
the energy sector encouraged. We must learn lessons from 
the regulatory failure witnessed in the fossil fuel and 
nuclear sectors. For society’s and the environment’s sake, 
the same mistakes cannot continue to be made.
Copyright © 2020 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.
